The 2024 Non-Fatal Incident Summary Part One: Landing Incidents

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Sunday, June 8, 2025

Above: Photo by PaulaKemph-Behrens.

The skydiving community has impressively driven down the number of annual fatalities over the past six decades, and 2024 marked a historic milestone. For the first time since USPA began keeping records in 1961, the U.S. civilian skydiving fatality count dropped into the single digits—just nine fatalities from an estimated 3.88 million skydives. This resulted in an index rate of 0.23 deaths per 100,000 jumps or an average of one fatality in 431,111 skydives, the lowest ever recorded.

That kind of progress doesn’t happen by accident. It’s the product of continuous effort across the industry—through better equipment, evolving training programs, enhanced safety devices and a deepening safety culture at drop zones nationwide. But this progress has also relied on something else: the consistent reporting and analysis of non-fatal incidents. These reports allow USPA to identify patterns, update training and push safety forward.

While many continue to aim for zero fatalities, we must recognize that even that achievement wouldn’t make skydiving “safe” in the conventional sense. Skydiving is—and always will be—an activity that carries inherent risk. But it remains sustainable with vigilance, proper decision-making and a culture of accountability. Reporting non-fatal incidents is a key part of that. No matter how minor it may seem, each report presents an opportunity for the entire community to learn, adjust and improve.

In 2024, USPA received 269 non-fatal incident reports—59 fewer than 2023’s total—even as the number of jumps increased by more than 230,000. There is a chance this is due to improved safety, but industrial-accident models much as Heinrich’s Pyramid and Bird’s Triangle suggest that underreporting is a more probable cause. Indeed, comparisons with data from other skydiving associations support the idea that the USPA should receive more than 6,000 incident reports annually.

An unreported incident might seem minor on its own, but when viewed as part of a broader pattern, it can provide critical insight into emerging trends. No matter how small or insignificant an event may seem, choosing not to report it is a missed opportunity to improve safety. Increasing the quantity and quality of incident reports is one of the most effective ways USPA members can support the continued safety and long-term sustainability of skydiving in the U.S.

The Injury Severity Index (ISI)

This report utilizes an Injury Severity Index (ISI) that categorizes the severity of the injuries sustained during incidents on a scale of 1 to 5.

  1|  Soft-tissue injury typically requiring only local first aid

  2|  One broken bone or multiple breaks of a single bone or joint and dislocations

  3|  Multiple broken bones

  4|  Traumatic brain or spinal cord injury

  5|  Fatal (not included in this report)

In the following sections, we categorize non-fatal incidents by their primary causes and show the percentage each category represents. Because comprehensive historical data is limited, we compare the 2024 figures to the 2019–2023 average to help identify patterns and guide future safety improvements. After excluding fatality reports, reports filed as general safety concerns without a specific incident and submissions lacking sufficient detail for proper classification, this analysis focuses on the remaining 215 incidents.

Landing Problems

112, 52.1% (2019-2023–48.6%)

Landing-related incidents rose 3.5% in 2024 compared to the previous year. From 2019 through 2021, they accounted for 45% of all incident reports and had an average ISI rating of 2.1. From 2022 through 2024, that number climbed to 54%. Without full reporting, it’s difficult to determine whether landing issues increased or whether members reported them more often. Another factor may also be affecting the trend. As noted in the 2024 fatality summary, the number of landing incidents has remained relatively stable, while other categories have gradually declined. This shift makes it look like landing problems are increasing when, in reality, their proportion is rising because other categories are in decline.

In response to these persistent statistics, USPA has taken several steps. Safety Day themes for the last three years have all focused on landing-related problems. Beginning with “Land Like Your Life Depends On It,” followed by “Stay Alive – Practice Five,” and now this year’s theme, “Expect the Unexpected,” each campaign has aimed to raise awareness of low-altitude emergency procedures and the canopy skills needed to respond to emergencies under a fully inflated canopy. These themes are rooted in trends observed through incident and fatality data. Most recently, USPA launched a comprehensive rewrite of the Skydiver’s Information Manual, including an introduction to Canopy-Flight Emergency Procedures (CEPs) in the student program. This addition is designed to help new jumpers develop the skills and mindset to safely handle emergencies after deciding a canopy is landable.

Three subcategories of landing problems—each requiring different areas of training to prevent—compromise the overarching category. These subcategories of landing problems are:

•  Intentional low turns: purposeful high-performance maneuvers for landing. These usually involve a jumper initiating a high-performance turn at an altitude too low for the parachute to return to straight-and-level flight before reaching the ground.

•  Unintentional low turns: unplanned low turns, usually to avoid other parachutes in the air or obstacles on the ground.

•  Non-turn-related: includes improper landing techniques, landing on obstacles or encountering other hazards (such as deep water) while under a properly functioning parachute.

Injury Severity Index Ratings

Category of Turn

Intentional Low Turn	ISI – 3.1
Unintentional Low Turn	ISI – 2.5
Landing Problem (No Turn)	ISI – 2.1

 

Degree of Turn

Less than 180°	ISI – 2.3	64%
More than 180°	ISI – 4.0	36%

 

Unfortunately, this year too many reports were missing information on canopy size, exit weight or both to be able to compile meaningful statistics on wing loading in relation to ISI.

Intentional Low Turns 11, 5.1% (2019-2023–7.1%)

Intentional low turns, often associated with high-performance landings, decreased slightly in 2024 but continued to result in serious injuries, with an average ISI rating of 3.1. These incidents affected both experienced canopy pilots and C-licensed jumpers exploring high-performance maneuvers. The data again confirmed a consistent pattern: The larger the turn the more severe the outcome.

All incidents involved experienced jumpers attempting 90-degree or greater turns, often under ideal weather conditions and with functioning equipment. A common thread was target fixation—jumpers becoming locked into completing a maneuver despite unsafe setups or crowded landing patterns. In at least two cases, jumpers continued with their turns even after recognizing they were too low or too close to others, resulting in high-speed impacts and long-term recoveries.

One striking case involved a jumper enrolled in a high-performance canopy course. Despite coaching and audible altitude cues, the jumper initiated a brake-surge front-riser maneuver at an unsafe altitude. He tried to complete his turn faster to compensate for the low start, resulting in a steep dive and impact with the ground, which caused multiple fractures. Another jumper executed a 270-degree turn too low after overshooting his planned setup point.

While some of these incidents involved jumpers pushing their limits, others were lapses in judgment such as failing to adjust for conditions, equipment or traffic. Whether influenced by ambition, distraction or poor planning, the result was the same: impact during the final stages of a turn, often before the flare could be completed.

The continued appearance of these incidents underscores the importance of proper planning, sufficient recovery altitude and the discipline to follow through. While experience and equipment vary across cases, target fixation is the leading cause. Jumpers too often commit to a turn despite mounting evidence that it can’t be completed safely. The solution isn’t just technical skill—it’s making a sound plan and sticking to it or having the wherewithal to bail out when the setup does not go as planned. A well-executed straight-in landing beats a low turn gone wrong every time. Save the swoop—and your limbs—for another jump, or join the growing list of those who’ve had to learn the hard way.

Unintentional Low Turns 15, 7.0% (2019-2023–4.8%)

Unintentional low turns increased in 2024 to 7% of all reported incidents—a noticeable jump from the five-year average of 4.8%—and had an average ISI rating slightly lower than intentional low turns at 2.5. These events typically occur when jumpers make reactive, last-second inputs in response to poor setup, traffic congestion or unanticipated obstacles near the ground, usually due to a poorly executed landing pattern. Unlike high-performance maneuvers, these turns were unplanned and had little margin for error.

Despite the rise in reported unintentional-low-turn incidents in 2024, there were no fatalities in this category—an encouraging shift that may suggest jumpers are making less-aggressive corrections than in past years. It’s possible that instead of sharp or committed low turns, more jumpers are attempting smaller inputs or instinctively flaring early, which could be helping to reduce the severity of outcomes.

Still, in nearly every case, the jumper could have avoided injury using a controlled half-brake turn. These recoverable inputs offer a safer way to adjust heading or avoid obstacles at low altitudes. This is precisely why the USPA Board of Directors launched the “Stay Alive – Practice Five” campaign—an initiative built around five essential canopy–flight emergency procedure (CEP) skills. Among the CEPs are half-braked turns and low-turn recoveries—techniques specifically designed for situations like those in this category.

These skills work only if jumpers are already proficient before they’re needed. When someone finds themselves off-pattern, flying toward a hazard or running out of space, there’s no time to improvise. The ability to make a safe, recoverable decision at that moment depends on prior training and repetition.

What we’re seeing is a shift—not away from mistakes but toward smaller, more manageable ones. That’s progress, but there’s still work to do. CEP skills give jumpers a clear, practical path to reducing injury. Whether it’s a student struggling with altitude or situational awareness or an experienced jumper boxed in on final, having those tools—and knowing how to use them—can turn a potential injury into just another landing.

Non-Turn-Related 86, 40% (2019-2023–36%)

Among the 86 landing-related incidents that did not involve low turns, poor flare technique was the most common issue, accounting for 22.4% of these cases. The average ISI for poor flare landings was 2.3, reflecting at least one broken bone or dislocation. While improper flaring contributed to most injuries in this group, a deeper look at flare timing reveals a more nuanced pattern: jumpers who flared too early experienced less-severe injuries (ISI 2.0) than those who flared late (ISI 2.5) and significantly fewer than those who failed to flare at all (ISI 2.7). Interestingly, when timed correctly, jumpers who gave an uneven or half flare had the lowest ISI of 1.0.

This suggests that if a perfect landing is no longer an option, an early or partial flare is less harmful than a late or absent one. More importantly, jumpers must be prepared to follow up any unstable landing with a parachute landing fall. Incident data shows that even an imperfect attempt at a PLF—graceful or not—correlates with lower ISI scores, meaning less-severe injuries overall. The Skydiver’s Information Manual Chapter 1, Category A reinforces this: “Be ready to perform a parachute landing fall (PLF) with every landing.” It also states that stand-up landings should only be attempted when conditions are good. A PLF is especially critical when landing off-field or in unfamiliar terrain. Regular practice helps ensure this essential skill remains sharp and can be used effectively when needed.

Tandem landings accounted for 20% of these incidents and carried a consistent ISI of 2.0. These events frequently involved students failing to lift their legs while landing despite repeated instructions. Instructors should consider using midair leg checks or preemptively scooping a student’s legs when in doubt about the student’s ability to comply. Pre-jump mobility assessments and realistic evaluations of the student’s body-position awareness may prevent these common tandem injuries.

Obstacle-related incidents comprised 14.1% of the non-turn cases, with an average ISI of 2.3. These often involved fences, ditches, roads or airport infrastructure. They tended to occur when jumpers failed to adjust their pattern or allowed drift to carry them beyond the safe landing area. These events reinforce the importance of choosing conservative patterns, avoiding terrain boundaries and selecting alternate landing options early when conditions deteriorate.

Slide-in landings on uneven ground represented 11.8% of these incidents, averaging an ISI of 2.0. Most involved jumpers catching a foot or hand on rough terrain—dirt clumps, holes or small obstacles—during a slide. Even experienced jumpers suffered fractures during these attempts. The SIM recommends using a PLF whenever ground conditions are unpredictable. Sliding in should not be the default landing technique on irregular or unknown surfaces.

Turbulence-related incidents comprised 9.4% of the non-turn incidents, with an ISI of 1.9. While the injuries were slightly less severe on average, these incidents were often sudden and unavoidable, occurring just before landing as canopies entered thermals or mechanical turbulence near buildings or paved areas. These cases demonstrate the importance of site awareness and planning final approaches that avoid areas likely to generate unstable air, especially on warm days or during midday operations.

The most severe injury in this group came from a dropped toggle, which led to a high-speed descent and an ISI of 3.0. Although rare, this incident shows how quickly canopy control errors can escalate if not immediately corrected.

Across all categories, the most important takeaway is that the injury severity was not determined only by the initial error but by how the jumper responded to that error. Flare timing matters—but readiness to PLF matters more. Jumpers should keep their hands close to the torso during the flare, ensuring even input for more power and stability. After the flare, hands should rotate inward toward the lower center of the torso to set up proper PLF posture. These habits increase the likelihood of absorbing the landing impact safely.

 

Conservative planning, pattern flexibility and readiness to perform a PLF remain the strongest defenses against injury when landings don’t go as planned. Whether the issue stems from poor flare timing, an unexpected obstacle, or turbulence on the final, the data makes this one thing clear: how a jumper responds in the final seconds determines the severity of the outcome. Good habits—like keeping hands close to the torso during a flare and setting up for a PLF—can be the determining factor between walking away or being carried off.

But even with this level of analysis, we’re still only seeing part of the picture. Underreporting remains a serious obstacle. Every unreported incident leaves a blind spot in our collective understanding, making identifying patterns and preventing future injuries harder. If every jumper committed to submitting reports—even for incidents they walked away from—the data could guide even more significant improvements in training, awareness and canopy safety.

Landing incidents may account for the largest share of injuries, but they’re not the only threats jumpers face. Next month, we’ll examine the other side of the story: equipment problems, in-air collisions, entanglements and low deployments. These non-landing incidents carry their own risks—and often arrive with even less warning.

Next Month: The 2024 Non-Fatal Incident Summary—Part Two: Non-Landing Incidents