The 2024 Non-Fatal Incident Summary Part Two: Non-Landing Incidents
Part one of this article (June Parachutist) provided an analysis of the 112 landing-incident reports from 2024, which accounted for 56.1% of all non-fatal incident reports for the year. In this part two, we examine the remaining reports, all concerning incidents that did not occur during landing. To target the most critical concerns and provide actionable recommendations, we will focus on the four categories with the highest number of incidents.
Equipment Problems—36, 17%
(2019-2023–13%)
Equipment-related incidents rose to 17%, a noticeable increase from the five-year average of 13%. Despite this, the average injury severity index (ISI) across 36 reports was just 0.42, because most events did not result in injury. Only eight incidents included reported injuries, with an average ISI among those rising to 1.71. While most were moderate, two involved severe trauma (ISI 4), such as spinal or brain injury.
What stands out in the injury data is that the original equipment issue, whether a brake line malfunction, misrouted component or line twist, was often just the beginning. In several cases, the situation became more complicated when the jumper responded incorrectly. For example, a jumper who experienced line twists after deployment lost altitude awareness, and an automatic activation device mistakenly left in student mode fired the reserve into an already compromised main. The resulting two-canopy entanglement led to a hard landing and serious injury. In another incident, a PRO-rated jumper experienced a partial detachment of his flag during main-canopy deployment. He grabbed and held the flag throughout the canopy descent but forgot he wasn’t holding the left toggle and flared for landing with both hands, causing a severe turn, hard landing and injury.
These examples reflect a familiar pattern: most equipment problems are manageable—until they’re not. It’s not just the initial malfunction that matters; it’s the gear setup and how quickly and effectively the jumper responds.
Among the eight injury cases, three involved automatic activation devices, most of which were set to the wrong mode, causing reserve activations and canopy entanglements. These cases emphasize that while AADs are critical safety devices, they rely on correct configuration. A mismatch between the device mode and the jumper’s discipline can turn a safeguard into a hazard.
Packing problems were the most frequently reported subcategory overall, appearing in eight reports. These typically involved misrouted components or poorly stowed bridles. One jumper suffered a hard opening and shoulder injury after a bridle became unstowed during the climb to altitude and snagged on something during the climb out, resulting in a premature deployment. Another case involved a brake line being misrouted around a removable deployment system, which caused the canopy to spin on opening. These incidents highlight the importance of focusing during assembly and packing, as well as conducting deliberate gear checks.
Line twists appeared in five reports, most commonly following freefly jumps. In these cases, line twists developed during deployment and were generally attributable to an asymmetrical body position during deployment rather than a packing error. One jumper began to spin rapidly under a canopy with line twists and had to cut away. Investigators found no issues with gear configuration or packing techniques, which suggested to them that the twist was caused by uneven shoulder or hip alignment during the deployment and inflation phases of the canopy opening. These incidents highlight how body position during deployment can influence canopy performance as much as equipment setup and packing can, especially when jumpers don’t take the time to get stable and belly to earth before deployment when breaking off from non-belly-to-earth orientations.
Hard pulls accounted for four reports, but none identified a clear mechanical cause. What they did show was a concerning pattern: In each case, the jumper lost altitude awareness, became unstable or both while attempting to resolve the deployment problem. Although it’s likely that some jumpers experienced hard pulls, remained stable and altitude aware and executed emergency procedures successfully, without reports of those events, the submitted cases paint a different picture. In all four reports, poor performance that escalated the situation followed the hard pull. These incidents contributed to three of the eight injuries in the equipment problems category, reinforcing a key lesson: When you experience a deployment difficulty, it’s the composure and competence of the response that matter most.
Jumpers should treat gear assembly and packing as a deliberate, unrushed process, not a routine chore. Handle placement, AAD settings, bridle stows, bridle routing—each deserves full attention. If something feels off during gear-up, stop and investigate. Most of these incidents weren’t caused by bad luck or mechanical failure; they were caused by minor oversights that became missed opportunities to prevent something worse.
Collisions—13, 6.1%
(2019-2023–4.5%)
The collisions category includes collisions during freefall, under canopy and with aircraft, each with distinct characteristics and contributing factors. Of the 13 incidents, 100% involved injuries, with an average ISI of 1.85, making this one of the more injury-producing categories overall.
When comparing collision incident rates by license level, the data shows a steady increase from A through C licenses, peaking at C (incident rate = 0.7), before declining slightly for D-license holders. This statistic suggests that jumpers begin exploring more advanced disciplines and participating in larger groups before fully developing the awareness and skills needed to manage complex aerial environments. These findings support the Skydiver’s Information Manual recommendations that jumpers who are still gaining experience with new disciplines and larger groups should limit group size and complexity.
Freefall Collisions
Freefall collisions made up the majority of the Collisions category, with seven incidents and an average ISI of 2.29. These occurred during linked exits, wingsuit formations or mixed-disciplined jumps, and nearly all were attributed to instability, poor planning or mistakes the jumper made while pushing the limits.
Two incidents involved linked exits by wingsuit jumpers who became unstable immediately after launch. In one, the two flyers lost their grips and became unstable, which led to a collision in which one jumper suffered a serious injury (ISI of 4). Another incident occurred during a mixed formation skydive, when a minor freefall collision resulted in one jumper unintentionally opening the main flap of the other jumper’s rig, causing a premature opening when the jumper transitioned to back-flying. The deployment caused the jumpers to collide a second time, causing minor injuries and cutting the jump short for both.
One of the more severe injuries (ISI 4) occurred during an XRW (“extreme relative work,” i.e., mixed canopy and wingsuit flight) jump, where poor planning and practice contributed to a midair collision between two wingsuiters. Both were experienced, but the plan changed during the ride to altitude, causing confusion during the jump and ultimately leading to the collision. Moving forward, XRW participants must prioritize thorough pre-jump coordination and stick to pre-established flight plans. The SIM recommends clear discipline-specific briefings, including exit order, breakoff altitudes and contingency plans. This incident serves as a potent reminder that communication breakdowns, even among skilled jumpers, can have serious consequences when flight paths intersect at high speeds with limited margin for error.
Canopy Collisions
Canopy collisions accounted for five incidents but only two reported injuries. These two injuries, both with an ISI of 3, stemmed from one incident in which a jumper made aggressive S-turns during final approach, unaware that another jumper was directly behind. This led to a canopy collision and entanglement approximately 30 feet above the ground, causing both jumpers to spiral the rest of the way down and sustain multiple broken bones.
In another case, a student on their fourth jump made a late decision to change the direction of their landing, resulting in a turn that caused a canopy collision. The remaining incidents occurred during large group skydives where jumpers lost track of one another following breakoff and collided shortly after opening. Jumpers should always keep their heads on a swivel, watching for canopy traffic.
Canopy collisions are rarely the result of a single poor decision. Instead, they reflect a breakdown in situational awareness or misjudging distances, especially in congested patterns. The SIM reinforces the importance of making predictable, straight-in approaches and maintaining horizontal separation throughout descent. Whether a student or experienced jumper, situational awareness and adherence to traffic patterns remain essential for avoiding canopy collisions.
Aircraft Collisions
Only one incident involved contact with the aircraft. It resulted in a minor injury. A jumper with an A license and 26 total jumps struck their head on the edge of the door while exiting a Cessna 208B from the floater position. The contact occurred due to poor body positioning during the exit. The jumper was not wearing a helmet, which may have increased the severity of the impact.
What connects all three collision types—freefall, canopy and aircraft—is that they are largely preventable with proper planning and rehearsal. Most were not caused by momentary lapses but by gaps in pre-jump coordination, failure to maintain appropriate spacing or misjudgments in flight paths. These events underscore the importance of discipline-specific briefings, clear exit and pattern plans and active spatial awareness from exit to landing. Whether in a tracking group, under canopy or in a wingsuit formation, the risk of collision increases exponentially when jumpers operate on assumptions rather than communication.
Low Deployments—10, 4.7%
(2019-2023–3.7%)
Low deployments occurred across all license levels but were four times more likely for students. All these incidents involved a jumper deploying their main low enough for their AAD to fire during the deployment of their main canopy, leading to a two-canopies-out scenario. Although none of the incidents resulted in serious injury, the circumstances surrounding these events consistently involved distractions that impaired altitude awareness.
Main-handle problems also occurred across all license levels. In these cases, the jumper struggled to locate or extract the handle and became fixated on removing it well past the recommended decision altitudes. These jumpers failed to transition to emergency procedures within the two attempts the SIM recommends, resulting in deployments at dangerously low altitudes.
Instability also played a role, particularly for jumpers who were distracted due to tumbling or flipping at deployment altitudes, which caused them to delay their responses while trying to regain stable body positions. The SIM states that a jumper should never sacrifice altitude for stability and must deploy at the assigned altitude, regardless of stability.
Two of the incidents involved instructors who delayed deployment while trying to assist their students. In one notable case, an experienced instructor chased a spinning student down past their own hard deck. This led to the instructor’s AAD firing during main-canopy deployment and a two-canopies-out situation. Although the instructor landed safely, the incident shows how even experienced jumpers can compromise their safety when prioritizing student management over altitude awareness.
These events reinforce a critical principle in skydiving: A jumper should not treat their deployment altitude as a suggestion but as a hard deck where they must immediately react if there is a problem. It’s not the time to troubleshoot, it’s the moment to get a canopy overhead. Whether caused by gear issues, disorientation or distraction, low deployments often result from hesitation under pressure. The difference between a close call and a fatality is frequently just a few hundred feet. Jumpers must stay altitude aware and prioritize performing emergency procedures over stability. They also must train to recognize malfunctions quickly, resisting the urge to over-analyze the situation in midair or troubleshoot more than twice.
Entanglements and Instability—9, 4.2%
(2019-2023–0.7%)
Entanglements and instability accounted for 4.3% of all non-fatal reports. Although none of the cases resulted in injury, the circumstances reveal a strong connection between body stability and equipment entanglements during deployment. While D-licensed jumpers appear twice as likely to experience these issues by percentage, a closer look shows the incident rate is proportionate to the number of jumpers at each license level. Not surprisingly, students were five times more likely per capita to encounter stability or entanglement problems. These two factors—often treated separately—frequently overlap in actual incidents, where instability leads to entanglements or entanglements cause the jumper to become unstable.
Five of the incidents started with equipment entanglements. In one case, a student jumper on a hop-and-pop had their pilot chute slip under their arm after an off-heading exit and a weak throw. The jumper managed to clear the bridle midair and successfully deploy. However, this decision to troubleshoot instead of immediately following emergency procedures deviated from SIM protocol and set a risky precedent. While the outcome was positive in this instance, it may reinforce a habit of hesitation or problem-solving in freefall. If a similar malfunction occurs on a future jump—say, at 3,500 feet with a higher fall rate—the student may attempt the same approach with far less margin for error. This is a prime example of how a successful recovery today can lead to dangerous decision-making tomorrow.
Four additional incidents started with instability. In one case, a tandem instructor’s drogue bridle entangled with their arm after an unstable drogue deployment. Unable to clear the entanglement, the instructor deployed the reserve. In another case, an AFF skydive began with a stable exit and controlled maneuvers, but the student lost control during the third turn and began to tumble. The instructor caught and righted the student at approximately 2,500 feet and successfully deployed the student’s reserve. To the instructor’s credit, they turned and tracked until they deployed their own reserve at 1,800 feet, likely avoiding a two-canopy out scenario. This incident demonstrates how rapidly instability can escalate and affect both student and instructor, and how critical it is for instructors to maintain strict altitude awareness even while assisting students.
While it’s reassuring that no injuries were reported in this category, these incidents still serve as cautionary examples. Jumper training must continue to emphasize clean exits, strict adherence to deployment altitudes and decisive execution of emergency procedures. Instructors and coaches should use these events to reinforce sound decision-making under pressure, particularly when jumpers are tempted to “fix” a malfunction midair rather than follow their training. A malfunction that ends without injury may appear harmless, but if not thoroughly debriefed, it can set a dangerous precedent for future incidents.
One recurring theme across all categories—equipment issues, collisions, low deployments and instability—is that most incidents were not due to gear failure or chance, but to momentary lapses in awareness, planning or adherence to training. These non-landing incidents remind us that composure, preparation and training are essential throughout the entire jump, not just the final seconds. Fortunately, nearly all these situations are avoidable, and many were resolved without injury. However, we can’t rely solely on luck or skill.
That’s why reporting non-fatal incidents is so important. Each report helps identify patterns, refine training and prevent future harm. Even when no one is hurt, the lessons are real. By sharing close calls and near misses, you contribute to a broader understanding of risk and safety in our sport. Better data leads to better decisions, and better decisions can prevent injuries. If we want to keep making progress toward fewer injuries, smarter jumpers and safer skies, it starts with you telling your story. And that means reporting every incident, not just the ones that make headlines.