   |
 |
|
|
||
| Incident
reports
These summaries are compiled from field reports and
are as accurate as possible from such input. USPA publishes them
here for their educational value. An *
indicates a non-fatal incident. Click here to see accident statistics. Updated 5/13/08 Age: 35 Description: This jumper exited last out of a Cessna Caravan for a solo skydive. There were no witnesses to his freefall, deployment or landing. Almost 48 hours after the jump took place, his body was discovered lying in a field just off of airport property. Investigators found his harness and container approximately 30 feet from where he was located with his reserve canopy deployed. His main canopy was found nearby, released from the harness and container system and trapped in its deployment bag. The jumper's hard landing under his reserve canopy had resulted in serious injuries, including a broken leg, ankle, pelvis and two cervical vertebrae, as well as head injuries. Since he was found away from his harness and container system, investigators determined that he must have survived the initial impact but died of his injuries before he was found or able to get help. Conclusions: Investigators found this jumper's gear with the reserve deployed, the reserve's slider all the way down to the risers and both brakes still stowed. The cutaway handle had been pulled, but the reserve ripcord handle was still attached to the harness. The main canopy had released from the harness and was found nearby, still in its deployment bag due to a bag lock malfunction. The main canopy, cutaway handle, reserve pilot chute and freebag were all found within a 20-yard radius of the jumper, which would indicate that the cutaway and reserve deployment took place at very low altitudes, likely lower than 1,000 feet above the ground. The jumper likely struck the ground before his reserve had a chance to fully inflate and slow him down to a survivable descent rate. After deploying his main canopy, the jumper apparently experienced a bag lock malfunction; however, it's impossible to determine at what altitude he deployed his main. Investigators concluded that the jumper's automatic activation device had deployed his reserve parachute since the reserve closing loop had been cut by the unit's cutter and the reserve ripcord was still in its pocket on the main lift web of the harness. The rig was equipped with a reserve static line, but it was not connected to either riser, and it's unclear whether it was disconnected before or during the jump. Evidence at the scene indicated that the reserve canopy had inflated but did not have enough time to fully slow the jumper before he struck the ground. Investigators could not determine at what altitude this jumper initiated main canopy deployment. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 2-1 requires that students and A-license holders deploy no lower than 3,000 feet above the ground to allow enough altitude for them to properly handle a main canopy malfunction, with minimum altitudes of 2,500 feet for B-license holders and 2,000 feet for C- and D-license holders. Section 5-1 recommends students and A-license holders decide upon and take action to initiate emergency procedures by 2,500 feet, while B- through D-license holders should do so by 1,800 feet. Although this jumper pulled his cutaway handle at some point, it's unclear at what altitude. It's also unknown whether his AAD had already deployed his reserve while the main risers and main deployment bag were still attached or if he pulled his cutaway handle to release his main canopy before the AAD activated the reserve. The investigator did not report finding any friction burns on either canopy or line set, indicating that the main and reserve canopies most likely did not rub together during deployment and that the jumper apparently pulled his cutaway handle and released his main canopy before the AAD deployed his reserve. If the RSL had been hooked up to the main risers, the reserve deployment may have been initiated sooner, saving precious altitude and possibly providing more time for the reserve to slow the jumper before landing. Although the AAD had cut the reserve loop, investigators did not return the unit to the manufacturer to determine what altitude the device actually activated the reserve. According to a representative from the AAD's U.S.-based service center, at least two reasons could explain the low reserve deployment in this jumper's situation: The AAD may have activated the reserve at the unit's preset altitude of 750 feet, but the reserve canopy could have experienced a hesitation during some stage of the deployment and inflation. Just a short delay in any part of the reserve deployment would be enough to make a difference between a safe descent rate and striking the ground at a high rate of speed while the reserve was still inflating. The representative suggested that another possibility was that the inflated main pilot chute and deployment bag may have provided enough drag to slow the jumper below the 78 mph descent rate required to activate the unit. If this was the case and the jumper had pulled his cutaway handle somewhere around 750 feet or slightly higher, it would have taken him a few seconds to reach the necessary speed to activate the AAD, thus initiating the reserve deployment lower than the normal activation height. Still, without the data from the unit or any witness accounts, it's impossible to determine exactly why the reserve did not have enough altitude to slow the jumper to a safe descent rate. The jumper initially survived the landing, as indicated by the fact that he had removed his rig and was found 30 feet away from his gear. However, either no one noticed that he had not returned from the jump or people thought he had intentionally landed near his trailer where he stayed on the drop zone since it was the last jump of the day. If a skydiver doesn't plan to return to the regular landing area or packing hangar after a jump, he should tell at least one other jumper on the load his plan and make a phone call to manifest after he lands to let them know he landed uneventfully. Some drop zones use a system that requires each jumper to check in with manifest after each load, which can help the DZ determine if a jumper is missing so a search can begin immediately if necessary. Lastly, the toxicology test conducted on the jumper following the accident indicated a positive test result for the presence of marijuana in a concentration strong enough that the lab technician said the jumper was more than likely under the influence of the drug at the time of his accident. Jumping while under the influence of drugs or alcohol has resulted in injuries and fatalities in the past and is prohibited by the FAA and USPA for good reason. Drugs and alcohol can slow reaction times and cause many other adverse reactions that can lead to skydiving injuries and fatalities. System: Flightline Reflex Age: 37 Cause of Death: Blunt force trauma due to a hard landing under a spinning main canopy Description: Following an uneventful initial freefall during a coach jump, this jumper tracked away from his coach at an unreported altitude before deploying his main canopy at the planned altitude of 4,000 feet. The coach reported that the student may not have slowed down after tracking and before deploying and that the canopy then opened hard and began to turn to the left for the remainder of the descent. The student landed hard in a field, with the canopy still in a turn as he struck the ground. His coach landed next to him a minute later, and a medically trained skydiver arrived moments after; neither responder was able to find a pulse or any other sign of life. Ambulance personnel arrived minutes later and pronounced this jumper dead at the scene. Conclusions: Witnesses reported seeing this jumper under canopy in what was described as an "orbiting-type turn" rather than a fast spin. The report did not indicate whether the jumper appeared to be conscious or was somehow incapacitated after opening. The coach who followed the jumper under canopy expected to find him possibly injured from the landing, but did not think the canopy's descent rate was fast enough to cause fatal injuries. This jumper was using a main canopy with a wing loading of 1:1, which the manufacturer recommends for jumpers classified as intermediate. (The manufacturer does not further define its experience levels to indicate what qualifies a jumper as intermediate.) Regardless of a jumper's experience, a landing under any canopy with a 1:1 wing loading and while in a turn will result in a hard impact. Investigators at the scene found the main canopy with one steering line broken but no other damage to the canopy or suspension lines. The report did not indicate whether the toggle with its steering line intact was found stowed or unstowed. The slider had not been collapsed, and both the main canopy cutaway handle and reserve ripcord were found in place on the harness. In a test on the ground after the accident, investigators placed the harness and risers under a 200-pound load and were able to pull both handles easily. The report stated that this was the first time the rig had been jumped since it had received a reserve repack, but it was unknown who packed the main canopy. The medical report stated that the jumper died from multiple blunt force injuries, including a fractured skull, multiple facial and rib fractures, a broken pelvis and two broken femurs. Although the canopy apparently opened hard, it is not clear what caused it to do so. Over the years, hard openings have led to many injuries and several fatalities. Canopies made from zero-porosity canopy fabric, along with suspension lines that do not stretch (or "give") during deployment can lead to severe forces being placed on a jumper's body during an instant opening. Freefall speed, body position, temperature and altitude all factor into the speed of the deployment. However, carefully following the canopy manufacturer's instructions for assembly and maintenance, as well as careful packing procedures and deploying the canopy at a normal freefall speed in a stable body position are most likely a jumper's best protection against experiencing a hard opening. System: United Parachute Technologies Vector 3 Micron *A skydiver with approximately 2,000 jumps started his final approach into the wind at approximately 300 feet, with an additional 15 jumpers under canopy at different altitudes all setting up for a landing in the same large, open landing area. There were several other canopies also on final approach above and behind this jumper as he applied partial brakes and began a series of S-turns in an effort to shorten his approach for landing. Two skydivers behind this jumper barely escaped colliding with him—both ending up approximately 100 feet above and behind and 50 feet to each side of him—ultimately passing him on each side at nearly the same time. Both of these jumpers were at a higher wing loading and carried more speed than the jumper who was flying in brakes and making S-turns. All three jumpers landed closely together, but the landings were otherwise uneventful. Even though the three jumpers were following relatively similar landing patterns, the different speeds of their canopies combined with the unpredictable S-turns created a potentially hazardous situation. Jumpers should use S-turns only if absolutely necessary to land in a safe area and never while in a crowded landing pattern. If a jumper executes an S-turn, he must first look to each side and the space above, below and behind him to ensure there are no other canopies in the area that will be affected by his turn. It is safer to fly a predictable pattern that includes a straight-in final approach, especially in crowded landing areas, even if it means landing farther away from the intended touchdown point; landing safely is more important than landing close. Jumpers flying canopies with higher wing loadings and faster forward speeds and descent rates need to identify all possible traffic issues while still high enough to alter their landing patterns if it becomes necessary to avoid other canopies. *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, a student with 32 jumps turned into the wind—reported between 10 to 12 mph—for her landing approach but found that she was too far downwind to make it to the main landing area. She then initiated a 360-degree turn at approximately 900 feet in an attempt to locate a suitable alternate landing area. She aimed for an open field on the other side of a hangar with a flat roof 12 feet above the ground, but her approach came up short, and she landed on the roof of the hangar. Her canopy remained inflated after she landed, pulling her off the roof to the ground below. She suffered a broken ankle as a result of the awkward landing but no other injuries. Although this was this jumper's fourth jump of the day, it was her first since winds had picked up from their earlier range of five to six mph. She attempted to follow the same landing pattern on her last jump that she had used for her three earlier skydives, but the stronger winds pushed her farther downwind than she expected. Once she turned to face into the wind, she did not have the forward speed she anticipated. Jumpers should monitor wind speeds as the day progresses and adjust their landing patterns accordingly; Category C of the Integrated Student Program in the Skydiver's Information Manual addresses the necessary landing pattern changes as wind speeds increase. Although there was apparently clear space on each side of the hangar that would have provided a clear approach to a landing on flat ground, this jumper stuck with her plan to try and clear the hangar by flying overtop. Landing in a clear area and with the parachute's wing level should be a jumper's first priority in any landing, facing into the wind if at all possible. To avoid landing on an obstacle, this jumper may have been able to turn slightly during her final approach to land beside the hangar or possibly land in a clear area in a crosswind direction. *After an uneventful solo freefall, a jumper with 30 skydives deployed his main canopy at approximately 3,000 feet and began to spiral his 210-square-foot canopy for multiple revolutions in each direction. He stopped spiraling at approximately 1,000 feet above the ground, approximately 100 yards upwind of his planned pattern entry point. By the time he reached his intended 1,000-foot pattern entry point, he was several hundred feet lower than the other canopies entering the pattern at 1,000 feet. He flew his downwind leg in a direction that cut off another jumper at approximately 500 feet who had started a left-hand turn for his own base leg. The second jumper had to instead turn right, away from the intended landing area, to avoid the collision. (Fortunately, he had clear space available to land elsewhere.) The first jumper was oblivious to cutting anyone off with his base leg turn and proceeded with his base leg to his final approach. Once he turned on final, he cut off another skydiver already on final approach who was facing into the wind. The two canopies came within 30 feet of each other as the two jumpers flew parallel paths on final, with the first jumper still unaware of any impending collision. The other canopy pilot had observed this jumper's canopy approaching and turned his canopy away from the impending collision just enough to avoid him and land safely. The S&TA observed the entire event and grounded this jumper immediately for the remainder of the weekend. The S&TA then provided additional guidance on flying a landing pattern and tips for maintaining separation to help this jumper make better decisions in the future. Jumpers must fly predictable patterns under canopy while constantly scanning for other parachute traffic to ensure adequate vertical and horizontal separation. As jumpers prepare to enter their landing patterns, including altitudes up to 2,000 feet or more above the ground, they should create the necessary separation from other canopy traffic rather than spiral to get to their entry point. Jumpers must keep their heads on a swivel under canopy—even more so when in the pattern—to look for additional parachute traffic to avoid a collision. Age: 55 Description: This jumper planned a solo skydive with a deployment at 5,000 feet. Witnesses on the ground first noticed him under canopy at an unreported altitude flying away from the normal landing area. When he was approximately 2,000 feet above the ground, the witnesses could see that he was slumped in his harness and not steering his canopy. His parachute then began a gradual left turn, which continued until he struck the ground in an open area off the airport. He received immediate medical attention, where first responders found him unconscious with facial injuries and a very weak pulse. He was airlifted to a local hospital, where he died later that day. Conclusion: The report indicated that this jumper apparently suffered a debilitating stroke soon after deploying his main canopy. He had released his brakes and stowed his slider, both normal activities following a main canopy deployment. At some point above approximately 2,000 feet, he apparently lost consciousness, as he was no longer steering his parachute. He was jumping an elliptical canopy at a wing loading of 1.7:1, which produced a significant forward speed and descent rate. Although the cause of the gradual turn is unknown, it may have been due to the jumper's body position leaning more toward his left in the harness after he became unconscious. Striking the ground in a slight turn and almost in full flight at such a high wing loading resulted in fatal head and neck injuries, along with broken ribs and facial injuries. The coroner listed the cause of death as blunt force trauma following a stroke. Even though the jumper had suffered a stroke first, the examiner deemed the trauma from the hard landing as the actual cause of death. However, the coroner determined that the stroke was severe enough that even if the jumper had suffered it while on the ground, he most likely would not have survived. As jumpers get older, they must consider the additional physical stress that skydiving places on their body and keep an eye on any medical conditions they may have (such as high blood pressure or a family history of heart or vascular problems). This jumper underwent surgery in 2002 to have stents installed, apparently to open clogged arteries. Following the surgery, he was cleared by a doctor to resume skydiving. However, regular physical checkups are no guarantee against experiencing a stroke or heart attack while skydiving. Jumpers, especially those with pre-existing conditions, should closely monitor their health and err on the side of caution any time they don't physically feel up to jumping. System: Sun Path Javelin Age: 68 Description: Following an initially uneventful 6-way group freefall, witnesses observed this jumper at breakoff altitude begin to tumble away from the formation in an uncontrolled manner. He continued to tumble in freefall until his automatic activation device deployed his reserve parachute. He landed unresponsive under his reserve with his brakes still stowed. He received immediate medical attention, but was pronounced dead at the scene. Conclusion: According to the coroner's report, this jumper suffered a heart attack in freefall and died before he reached the ground. Although his AAD activated at the correct altitude and his reserve landed him relatively softly in an open area, rescue personnel were unable to revive him. The report did not indicate whether the jumper had any known prior medical issues that would have increased the risk of a heart attack during skydiving or strenuous activities. As the skydiving population and USPA members grow older, each jumper needs to consider his personal health and the risks involved with skydiving, including the medical risks of a heart attack or stroke. USPA expects to see an increase in this type of accident as the baby boomer generation gets older and the average age of membership increases. Skydiving is a physical activity that requires reasonable physical strength and agility. Those at risk of heart attack or stroke should carefully consider the additional physical stress that can result from skydiving and consult their physician if they have any questions. System: Sun Path Javelin *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, a student on his sixth jump was on final approach for landing, with winds reported at five mph but shifting directions by as much as 45 degrees. At approximately 100 feet above the ground, the student found himself pushed off the wind line by a gust of wind, reported only as "strong." The jumper was facing 45 degrees crosswind before he reached the ground. He flared his canopy at approximately five feet above the landing area and struck the ground hard with his legs apart and without performing a parachute landing fall. His hard landing resulted in a broken left ankle, which required surgery. He is expected to make a full recovery. Shifting and gusty winds can create challenging landings for jumpers of all experience levels. Jumpers must fully flare their canopy at the correct height above the ground regardless of wind direction. This student may have been able to avoid injury if he had flared sooner and performed a parachute landing fall as he touched down. The report did not indicate whether the student was equipped with a radio on this jump; canopy coaching from an instructor via radio can help a student keep his canopy flying in the necessary direction and flare at the correct altitude. Gusty and shifting winds require immediate and correct steering input to keep the canopy flying in the intended direction. Training and supervised practice are essential for each skydiver to learn both basic and more advanced canopy skills. *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, an A-licensed skydiver with 30 jumps landed in a six-inch-deep ditch in the middle of a flat and otherwise clear landing area. She did not attempt to perform a parachute landing fall, reportedly attempting to stand up her landing instead. The hard landing resulted in a broken tibia and fibula and a dislocated ankle. The report stated that she flared her canopy "a little late" but did not state exactly how high above the ground she was when she initiated her landing flare. This jumper may have been able to avoid her injuries by changing her heading to avoid the ditch while still high enough for a slight turn to be effective and safe. Flaring at the correct height above the ground and landing with a parachute landing fall when necessary can improve a jumper's chance of landing without injury. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 4, 5 and 6 contain useful information and canopy training drills that can help jumpers learn more about canopy flight and landings. *A skydiver with more than 700 jumps was attempting to land on a target during an accuracy competition. He was jumping a 170-square-foot canopy at a wing loading of 1.3:1. At approximately 50 to 60 feet above the ground, he made a rapid 120- to 140-degree toggle turn toward the target. The jumper apparently realized almost immediately that he was dangerously low for the turn he had just initiated. He flared his canopy while it was still in a diving turn to approximately half brakes in an attempt to slow his descent. He lifted his legs and placed them out in front of him before striking the ground butt-first at a high rate of speed. He traveled another 60 feet horizontally from his point of impact and came to rest in a sitting position. The hard impact resulted in several damaged vertebrae, a broken tailbone and a sprained ankle. His injuries did not require surgery, and he is expected to make a full recovery. The winds reportedly shifted after this jumper made his original plan for approaching the target, and there were small groups of people near the target area that may have been in the path of his planned approach. As he descended near the landing area, he may have been distracted by the crowds or surprised by the change in wind direction. Jumpers should assess landing areas and wind directions while still high enough to safely adjust their landing pattern should it become necessary. If the original landing point is not available, each descent strategy must also include a safe alternate spot and approach plan. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. Age: 26 Description: This jumper was making a wingsuit jump with two other skydivers during a large event at a drop zone where he did not normally jump. The three exited a Skyvan at approximately 13,000 feet AGL (more than 17,000 feet above sea level). They continued flying together until approximately 6,000 feet above the ground, where two of the jumpers turned to fly toward the drop zone, both losing sight of this jumper before deploying their parachutes at 3,500 feet and landing uneventfully. When this jumper did not return to the drop zone after a short time, a search began. The search party found him approximately one mile from the drop zone with his main pilot chute, cutaway handle and reserve ripcord still in place on his container. The reserve pilot chute had deployed on impact, and the reserve canopy was still in its freebag with a few feet of unstowed lines. The jumper was apparently killed instantly by the hard impact. Conclusions: The exact details of this fatality may never be discovered. However, several factors may hint toward a potential cause. This jumper had completed approximately 20 wingsuit jumps out of his 119 total jumps. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-9 recommends that jumpers making wingsuit jumps have at least 500 freefall skydives—or at least 200 freefall skydives within the previous 18-months—and that they receive one-on-one instruction from an experienced wingsuit jumper. Wingsuits can add additional risks to skydiving; knowledge, practice and skill are necessary to minimize these risks. Much of this can only be acquired by gaining experience and proficiency with the basics of skydiving first. Although oxygen was available on the load, this jumper chose not to use it. Witnesses stated that he did not exhibit any signs of hypoxia. This jumper's altitude awareness might have been affected by the visuals of jumping at a different drop zone or by the longer freefall time that is common on wingsuit jumps. He was wearing a wrist-mounted visual altimeter but not an audible altimeter, which is recommended as a valuable backup device by providing reminders at several pre-assigned altitudes. However, some audible altimeters do not work during wingsuit jumps due to the slow descent rate associated with wingsuit flights. This jumper's altimeter indicated 1,000 feet above ground level when found on the scene, but the area was actually located just 100 feet higher than the DZ's landing area. The altimeter error could have resulted from its impact with the ground at a high rate of speed, or the jumper may have set it incorrectly before the skydive. This jumper's rig was not equipped with an automatic activation device. A functioning AAD may have deployed his reserve at a safe altitude, although it is possible for a wingsuit pilot to slow his descent rate in freefall below the speed required for most AADs to activate. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-9 recommends that beginning wingsuit jumpers initiate deployment no lower than 5,000 feet. Additionally, SIM Section 2-1 requires that students and A-license holders deploy their main parachute no lower than 3,000 feet AGL, B-license holders by 2,500 feet, and C- and D-license holders by 2,000 feet. As with many no-pull accidents, it is difficult to find a specific cause. System: Rigging Innovations Talon *After an uneventful freefall, a skydiver with 81 jumps deployed her canopy at an unreported altitude. Her parachute opened with spinning line twists, which she was able to kick out of. However, due to a rapid spin caused by one brake being unstowed while the other was still set, she could not grab her toggles to release the stowed brake. She pulled her cutaway handle, and the reserve static line deployed her reserve at an unreported altitude. She found herself over trees in strong and gusty winds 1,000 feet above the ground. According to the report, she elected to land in an area she knew she could reach instead of trying to make it back to the drop zone. The jumper reported that on her final approach, a strong gust of wind pushed her to her left. She struck a sign and then landed hard, suffering a broken pelvis in multiple places. She is expected to make a full recovery. The report did not provide any information regarding the size of the alternate landing area, the height of the sign she struck or if she attempted to use a parachute landing fall as she reached the ground. Jumpers should pack carefully and stow both steering toggles carefully so they stay in place during deployment. Even with this jumper's relatively light wing loading of 0.8:1, SIM Section 3-2 considers the 150-square-foot seven-cell canopy she was using a high-performance canopy based on its square footage. High-performance canopies can spin violently during a malfunction or, as in this case, with one steering line released. The report indicated winds were 15-plus mph and gusty during her jump. Strong, gusty winds can make it difficult to land safely and softly, regardless of the jumper's experience level. However, jumpers with less experience will likely have a more difficult time negotiating tricky winds than those with more jumps who have practiced their canopy skills. Often when winds become gusty, the more experienced jumpers on the drop zone stay on the ground and elect to wait for better weather conditions. Sometimes they've experienced a bad landing in strong winds or know someone who has; experience has taught many jumpers that unpredictable winds can lead to an injury or fatality. Newer jumpers can learn a valuable lesson by taking notice when a jumper with thousands of jumps stays on the ground because of wind conditions. Gusty winds require a jumper to give immediate and correct input to his canopy to keep the canopy's wing level and flying where he wants it to go. In this case, the jumper may have corrected the push toward her left with more input to the right toggle to counter the crosswind gust. With practice, a jumper can make this type of minor correction at any time during the canopy flight, even at a low altitude and during the landing flare. However, jumpers must perform these corrections properly to avoid making the situation worse with a low turn. Using braked turns to change heading is a valuable skill for all jumpers to learn and can help in a variety of landing situations. An experienced canopy coach can teach the proper technique, which can then be practiced at altitude before performing the drill during an actual landing. Jumpers should choose an alternate landing area that provides plenty of clear, open space, free from obstacles and far downwind of any trees or obstructions that can create additional turbulence. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 4 Category C includes information about wind and turbulence, and SIM Section 5-1 covers obstacles and off-field landing recommendations. *Three jumpers exited a Cessna at 10,000 feet for a planned no-contact canopy formation jump. The first jumper released a small kite connected by a 20-foot string to trail behind him as the other two canopies flew video from behind. At just over 3,000 feet AGL, the first jumper performed two practice flares on his canopy to decide if he should land with the kite attached or release it for landing. His flare slowed his canopy and caused him to gain altitude in relation to the other jumpers, and one of the other jumpers struck him from behind, entangling the two, with the first jumper passing through the second's canopy's lines. The first jumper's canopy deflated and collapsed. He then released his main canopy and deployed his reserve, which opened uneventfully. The second jumper and his canopy's lines remained entangled with the first skydiver's cutaway canopy but still suspended under his own fully inflated main. After a few seconds, he cut away and immediately pulled his reserve ripcord. The other jumper's cutaway canopy was still caught somewhere on this jumper or his equipment, so the deploying reserve did not clear the two entangled mains. This jumper impacted the ground at a high rate of speed with just a few cells of one of the main canopies inflated and the reserve still in its freebag, trapped and entangled in the main canopies. He was found conscious and breathing, but soon had difficulty breathing and was airlifted to a hospital. The report stated he suffered multiple broken bones along with trauma to his spinal cord, which resulted in paralysis that is expected to be permanent. Canopy formation flying requires specialized training and a plan for each canopy flight, even when there are no plans for contact or docking maneuvers. These plans should cover the exit, canopy flight, breakoff and landing procedures for each jumper on the jump. A trained canopy coach or canopy relative work coach should be consulted for any jumps that include close proximity flying of parachutes or canopy docking maneuvers. Before the flight, jumpers should carefully review emergency procedures, including responses to canopy entanglements. This jumper was still attached to the other jumper's canopy at approximately 3,000 feet when he cut away his own canopy. A better response may have been to continue to work to clear the entanglement while he still had sufficient altitude and then release the two main canopies once he was certain he had cleared all the lines from himself and his rig. The report indicated that his own main canopy was inflated and flying, which would have provided him with some time to work on clearing the lines of the other canopy before cutting away. A hook knife can be useful in this type of situation, allowing a skydiver to cut the trapped lines instead of having to physically untangle them from the container or the jumper himself. *A skydiver with approximately 400 jumps deployed his main canopy at roughly 2,100 feet. His parachute opened harder than usual, resulting in several broken lines and damage to its center cell. The jumper then released his main canopy and deployed his reserve, which opened uneventfully approximately 1,500 feet above the ground. The report indicated that he was over a wooded area and did not have sufficient altitude to fly to an open field for landing. As the jumper descended into the trees, he passed through their branches before landing hard on the ground, suffering a broken tibia and fibula. He is expected to make a full recovery. The report did not indicate if this jumper exited in the correct spot for the wind conditions or if there was another reason he opened in a location that would not allow him to land in a clear area, even from 1,500 feet under a reserve parachute. Jumpers should check the spot before leaving the airplane; if unable to do so due to a group exit, they should check the spot soon after leaving the airplane. It may be best to break off early if safely possible to deploy high enough to reach a clear area for landing. A post-jump inspection of this jumper's main canopy found that it was in poor condition prior to this jump and had been in need of a new line set and slider replacement long before this jump. Regular canopy and line inspections can help identify items that need to be repaired before they become bad enough to warrant a cutaway and reserve ride. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 4 Category E includes training on canopy inspections that can serve as a beneficial guideline for all jumpers. A parachute rigger or canopy manufacturer can be a good resource for main canopy inspections and repairs as well. *A skydiver with 127 jumps landed downwind in 10-mph winds. He flared his canopy to a half-braked position just as he reached the ground and the side of an upward-sloping hill, which further reduced the effectiveness of his partial flare. As he landed, he fell forward on his side, shoulder and head. The hard landing resulted in several injuries, including a bruised shoulder, broken ribs and a pulmonary embolism, as well as a concussion that briefly rendered him unconscious. He is expected to make a full recovery from his injuries. This jumper had recently returned to the sport after a long layoff. He had planned his landing pattern before the jump but landed facing opposite the direction in his flight plan, possibly due to misreading the wind sock, though it had not changed direction. Skydivers should monitor the wind direction and plan accordingly—before boarding the aircraft and throughout the canopy descent and landing. USPA's canopy flight planner is a valuable tool that can help students and licensed jumpers plan the jump run and spot for current conditions, as well as planning canopy descents and landing patterns. USPA customizes the planner for each drop zone using an aerial photograph to show the DZ's layout and compass headings. The planner is available through the USPA Shop in either an electronic file format or in printed pads. *A student on her 25th jump was on final approach to landing. She started her flare 12 to15 feet above the ground and pulled the toggles only to her shoulders, not fully flaring her parachute. She landed hard, with most of her weight initially on her right leg as she touched down, resulting in a broken lower leg. Jumpers must fully flare their canopies to slow down before reaching the ground and prepare for a parachute landing fall in case of a harder-than-usual landing. Skydivers can improve their landings through training and practice. Jumpers must also remain focused during each phase of the skydive—including the freefall, canopy descent and landing. *A skydiver with approximately two years in the sport and 400 jumps was using an elliptical canopy at a wing loading of 1.5:1. After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent from a Twin Otter with 22 other jumpers aboard, he planned to make a 90-degree turn at 400 feet above the ground for his final approach. However, he encountered additional canopy traffic that prevented him from making his planned turn to final, so he continued flying crosswind before attempting to turn into the wind on final at an altitude too low to recover from his turn. He struck the ground while still in a diving turn at a high rate of descent and fast forward speed. The hard landing resulted in a broken left femur, which required surgery to repair, but the jumper is expected to make a full recovery. This skydiver may have been able to avoid the traffic conflict with better planning of his canopy descent before reaching pattern altitude. With canopy traffic heavy, choosing a different landing site and flying out of the traffic if possible may have been a better option. If the jumper had found himself higher than the majority of the other canopies after opening, he may have been able to fly his parachute in deep brakes to slow his descent and allow the other skydivers to land before him. If he had been below the majority of the traffic, he could have considered performing a spiraling turn while keeping track of his flight path and while still at a safe altitude to get below and land ahead of the other canopies. Lastly, once the jumper found himself too low on his base leg to recover from a standard turn to final, he could have considered a braked turn or continued straight if his airspace was clear and landed crosswind. Flying a high-performance canopy at a high wing loading requires careful planning and execution of all phases of the canopy descent and landing. The additional speed and faster descent rate can be difficult to manage, particularly in heavy traffic conditions at pattern altitudes below 1,000 feet. At only 400 jumps, this jumper had to rapidly downsize to get to such a high wing loading in such a short time. Jumpers should only downsize to a smaller parachute after becoming completely proficient with their current canopy. The report did not indicate if this jumper had received any type of advanced canopy training from an experienced canopy coach. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 contain recommendations and useful canopy exercises that can benefit jumpers of all experience levels. An experienced canopy coach should present the material for best results. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. *A skydiver with 1,100 jumps and 12 years in the sport was making a 2-way freefly jump from 15,000 feet. Following an uneventful freefall, the second jumper deployed her main canopy at 3,500 feet while this jumper remained in a head-down position and videoed her deployment. He continued flying head-down while looking up toward her opening canopy before rotating to a belly-to-earth orientation to deploy. Witnesses reported that he deployed his main canopy at approximately 800 feet, which opened with line twists. At almost the same time, his Cypres automatic activation device activated his reserve. The jumper's two canopies formed a downplane at approximately 300 feet. Witnesses reported that the jumper then tried to gain control of his main canopy by pulling on the risers and then both steering lines while the canopy remained in line twists. The jumper continued in a fast, spiraling descent under both canopies until impact, where he was knocked unconscious from the hard landing, suffering severe head trauma, as well as a broken pelvis and arm. As of press time, he was reportedly still unconscious in a hospital's intensive care unit, but the report did not provide any additional information regarding the outlook for his recovery. Every group skydive should include a plan for breakoff and deployment procedures, even for a group as small as two jumpers. The report did not indicate whether filming the jumper's opening was originally part of the plan for the skydive. Jumpers must plan a breakoff altitude that allows them to gain horizontal separation and still deploy at a safe altitude following a group freefall. For skydives where one jumper is filming another's deployment, the first skydiver's deployment altitude must be high enough to allow the camera flyer to film the deployment, track horizontally and deploy at a safe altitude at or above 2,000 feet (for C- or D-license holders). It's easy to lose track of altitude while flying head-down due to the orientation's faster vertical speed and the different visual picture that the jumper has of the earth. This jumper was not wearing an audible altimeter; Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-2 recommends that jumpers use two audible altimeters while freeflying. SIM Section 5-1 also recommends that jumpers faced with a downplane malfunction disconnect their reserve static line (if their rig is so equipped and if time allows), release the main canopy and land under their reserve. This jumper used valuable altitude attempting to control his main canopy, which was in line twists and could not be steered until the twists were cleared. Releasing his main canopy may have allowed him a safe landing under his reserve. *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, a first-jump student on final approach drifted beyond his intended grass landing area and above a concrete surface, which was flat and free of obstacles. While slightly crosswind on final, he partially flared his canopy at approximately 30 to 40 feet before fully flaring while still too high for a normal flare. He landed hard on the concrete without performing a parachute landing fall and suffered a broken lower right leg and abrasions on his right side. In cases of a hard landing, a parachute landing fall can help reduce the chance of injury. The report did not indicate whether there was any assistance by an instructor or other personnel using a radio to help the student with his planned canopy flight. Use of a radio as a backup for solo students can help them fly their planned pattern and avoid obstacles or hard landing surfaces. *A skydiver with 200 jumps and a wing loading of 1.4:1 exited the airplane at 5,000 feet with the intention of making a high-performance landing. Before the jump, an instructor warned this jumper to be careful and mentioned to him that he should be wearing a helmet, which he was not. At approximately 100 to 200 feet above the ground, the jumper made one abrupt 180-degree turn and began a second 180-degree turn before striking the ground at the same time as his canopy with the parachute in a steep dive. After the initial impact, he traveled another 40 feet horizontally while wrapped in the lines and canopy material before coming to a stop. The impact was so hard that it also resulted in his reserve container opening. The jumper received immediate medical attention and was airlifted to a hospital in critical condition. He suffered severe head trauma, as well as multiple broken bones in his ribs, pelvis and legs. The hospital placed him in a medically induced coma and performed surgery to repair his broken bones. As of press time, the jumper had been in a coma for a month since his injury, but the S&TA reports he is slowly responding. USPA receives many similar reports of this type of canopy accident each year, with most resulting in a fatality or serious injury. Jumpers who choose to pursue high-performance canopy landings should get experienced canopy coaching and follow a structured program to learn the necessary skills to eliminate as much risk as possible. Even with training and experience, high-speed landings can be extremely dangerous, and jumpers must consider whether it is actually worth the risk of serious injury or death. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. *A skydiver with 1,000 jumps arrived at the drop zone and picked up her rig for a day of jumping after a recent reserve repack. When she thoroughly inspected her rig while getting ready for the first load of the day, she noticed that the reserve ripcord had apparently not been routed correctly since it was not attached to anything under the reserve flap. Her container, a United Parachute Technologies Micron equipped with a Sky Hook reserve static line (RSL), uses a reserve ripcord that is separate from the RSL lanyard and closing pin. With this system, it is possible to insert the reserve closing pin through its closing loop without attaching the reserve ripcord. The rigger who packed the reserve was not at the drop zone, so the jumper had a second rigger confirm what she had found. In this instance, pulling the reserve ripcord would not have worked to open the reserve because the pin was not attached. In the event of a partial malfunction, the RSL would have pulled the reserve ripcord pin following a cutaway, provided the RSL shackle was attached to the main canopy riser and functioned properly. In the case of a total malfunction, only the jumper's AAD cutting the reserve loop or the jumper physically grabbing the RSL lanyard and pulling it would have opened the reserve container. The second rigger repacked the reserve and properly inserted the closing pin through the reserve ripcord before inserting the pin through the reserve closing loop. This incident shows the importance of a thorough gear check and how important it is for each jumper to have thorough knowledge of their equipment. This applies even when a jumper's gear has been inspected or maintained by a very experienced rigger. Age: 44 Description: Following an uneventful exit and deployment at approximately 4,000 feet, this jumper initiated a 270-degree turn roughly 800 feet above the ground for his approach into a canopy course during a regional swoop competition. As the canopy began to level off from its recovery arc just above the ground, the parachute turned abruptly to the left, which caused the jumper to strike the ground in a diving turn at a high rate of speed. The jumper received immediate medical attention, but died at the scene from his injuries, which included compound fractures of his left tibia and fibula, a broken neck and a torn aorta. Conclusions: This jumper's 270-degree front riser turn created a diving approach toward the entry gates into the swoop course. As the canopy began to level off near the entrance to the course, he steered the canopy and flattened the recovery arc by pulling both rear risers evenly. After reviewing video footage of the incident, investigators reported that it appeared as though the right rear riser slipped from the jumper's hand as he pulled down on both rear risers, which caused the canopy to abruptly dive to the left. The diving left turn caused the jumper to strike the ground at a very high rate of descent and forward speed. Investigators could not determine if he had kept his steering toggles in his hands as he controlled his canopy with the risers, but he made no attempt to flare the canopy with toggles or rear risers. The video showed that only one-fourth second lapsed between the time when his riser apparently slipped from his hand and when he struck the ground—barely enough time to even realize what had happened, much less react to the situation. This jumper had participated in canopy competitions before this event and had trained with very experienced canopy competitors to learn more about high-performance canopy landings. The report did not indicate the number of jumps this skydiver had made with his current canopy—a 90-square foot cross-braced parachute—but with only four years of skydiving experience and 1,100 total jumps, he would have had to downsize rapidly. His wing-loading of 2.1:1 exceeded the maximum loading recommended by the manufacturer for expert skydivers. This accident shows there is no margin for error when flying highly wing-loaded canopies at fast speeds near the ground. There may have been a slight chance to flare the canopy with toggles and initiate a carving turn instead of striking the ground, but the response would have had to be immediate once the riser slipped from his hand. Jumpers should keep their toggles in hand until they have landed, even while using risers to control the canopy. Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. System: Mirage Systems G3 *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, a tandem instructor completed several practice landing drills with his student at approximately 3,500 feet. The six-foot, two-inch, 210-pound student was initially unable to lift his legs high enough to remain above the tandem instructor's feet. While practicing, the student was then able to pull his knees higher by pulling on the leg grippers of his jumpsuit with his hands. However, as the pair landed, the student let his legs drop, and his feet reached the ground before the instructor could touch down. The tandem instructor rolled over top of the student, who suffered a broken ankle; the instructor was uninjured. Tandem students must keep their legs and feet up during the landing in order to prevent this type of injury. The tandem instructor's height was not reported; however with taller students, it's helpful if the tandem instructor is also tall and the student's harness is adjusted properly to keep the student suspended as high as possible relative the tandem instructor during the canopy descent. *An experienced wingsuit jumper with 664 wingsuit skydives was exiting last from a King Air at 14,000 feet. As the jumper passed through the door, he felt the airplane begin to descend, but it was too late to stop his exit. He struck the airplane's horizontal stabilizer with the back of his left leg and suffered multiple injuries, including cuts, bruises and a broken femur. He tumbled for a short time after the impact but regained stability. He remained in freefall briefly before deploying his main canopy. Knowing he had suffered a broken leg from the impact with the plane, the jumper flew to the drop zone and landed with a parachute landing fall, rolling onto his right side to help protect his broken left leg. He received immediate medical attention and was transported to the local hospital, where he underwent surgery. Damage to the airplane was limited to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, and the plane landed uneventfully. Even though this jumper was exiting last, he sat at the back of the airplane instead of sitting near the pilot. The other groups had exited, and the pilot was unaware that a wingsuit jumper was on board. As the last group left the plane, the pilot did not see the wingsuit jumper approaching the door and thought the aircraft was empty. Jumpers and pilots must communicate on each load so both know what to expect during jump run and exit. This holds especially true with aircraft capable of flying multiple groups. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-9 contains recommendations for wingsuit jumpers, stating they should exit either first or last and brief the pilot about their exit and flight plan intended for each wingsuit skydive. Jump plane pilots should check carefully before descending to ensure all jumpers are out of the airplane and it's safe to begin the descent. *A skydiver with 25 jumps was on final approach preparing to flare in shifting winds, which were gusting from eight to 14 mph. As she flared the canopy, she experienced a gust that turned her canopy slightly crosswind. She reached toward the ground with her downwind hand, her left, turning the parachute farther crosswind before striking the ground. The hard landing resulted in cuts, bruises and a twisted ankle. Crosswind gusts can occur on days when the winds are gusty and shifting directions, but this doesn't change the fact that a jumper must continue to fly his canopy until he has touched down and come to a complete stop. Jumpers commonly react the way this skydiver did, reaching for the ground toward the low side of their body in an effort to break the fall. However, this reaction extends that steering line farther and actually causes the canopy to turn even harder into the ground. The correct response to a crosswind gust is to steer the canopy back into the wind; in this case, it would have been necessary to pull the right toggle down farther than the left in order to face into the wind. A jumper can do this even as he flares the canopy for landing, but it does require skill and practice at altitude to learn the proper technique. Also, in the event of a harder than usual landing, a parachute landing fall can help lessen the chance of an injury. *Following an uneventful 9-way formation skydive and initial canopy descent beginning at 3,000 feet, an A-licensed jumper with 77 jumps found himself as one of the lowest jumpers on the load under canopy. As he descended through 2,000 feet, he initiated a fast, spiraling turn to provide additional vertical separation between himself and the canopies above. He stopped spiraling at approximately 1,000 feet and noticed that his main canopy seemed to be “acting funny.” His container was equipped with a student-model Airtec Cypres automatic activation device, which had sensed his rapid descent as he spiraled his canopy and subsequently activated his reserve parachute. His 176-square-foot reserve deployed and inflated behind his main, a 170-square-foot parachute. The reserve then settled next to the main to form a side-by-side formation, with his main on the left and the reserve on the right. The jumper initially tried to fly the two canopies toward a clear area using the already unstowed toggles on his main canopy. The wind was blowing him toward a less-than-ideal landing area surrounded by trees, power lines, a fence and a busy road. Pulling on the main canopy's left toggle only resulted in the two canopies separating from each other and did not successfully alter his course. Shortly before landing and in a final attempt to steer himself away from a power line, he released the reserve's left brake with his right hand and pulled the left toggles on both canopies at the same time. Just before he hit the ground, he placed the reserve canopy's left toggle in a position that he estimated was equal to the pull from the reserve's right toggle (still in the stowed position) in an attempt to neutralize the effect on the canopy's flight from having one toggle stowed and one unstowed. He reported that he was unsure what happened next but that he landed in a clear area descending straight down and very hard. He later said that he immediately felt the wind get knocked out of him and pain in his lower back. It was not clear if his final attempt to steer the canopies caused his descent to accelerate toward the ground or if there was some other cause for the hard landing. He was taken by ambulance to a local hospital but did not require surgery for his injuries. This jumper's exit weight was 220 pounds, and his wing loading for both canopies was 1.3:1, which falls into a range the manufacturer of both canopies recommends only for expert skydivers. Although the manufacturer does not state what qualifies someone as an expert skydiver, most people in the skydiving industry would consider a jumper with 77 skydives to be a novice rather than an expert. Both student and expert Cypres units are designed to deploy a reserve canopy at an altitude of 750 feet above the ground when a descent rate is calculated to be faster than 78 mph. The student unit also includes an additional feature designed to deploy the reserve canopy if the descent rate is between 29 and 78 mph as a jumper passes through 1,000 feet. This additional parameter is built into the device to deploy the reserve canopy should a student experience a partial malfunction with a fast descent rate and not perform emergency procedures. The student-model's user manual cautions that it is possible to exceed a vertical speed of 29 mph under a fully inflated canopy and also recommends that the unit be turned off if descending in an airplane to avoid activation during descent. With the performance of modern canopies, it is easy for jumpers to exceed the vertical speed that will cause a student model to activate. Jumpers using gear equipped with the student model should avoid aggressive canopy maneuvers near or below 1,000 feet. In addition, this jumper's high wing loading on his main canopy greatly increased the parachute's responsiveness and the aggressiveness of its turns, which contributed to the rapid increase in his vertical speed when he spiraled the canopy. Based on a series of tests performed in the mid-'90s in a controlled environment using a variety of canopy sizes, Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 recommends one of two different procedures for managing a side-by-side canopy situation. Procedure one calls for disconnecting the reserve static line and then pulling the cutaway handle to release the main canopy; jumpers should cut away from this configuration only when there's no chance of the two canopies becoming entangled after the main is released. The second procedure calls for landing under both canopies by releasing both brakes of the larger, more dominant canopy to steer toward a clear area. *A D-licensed jumper with more than 5,000 skydives was performing a classic style series in freefall when he noticed his right steering toggle whipping around in the air behind him. The toggle and brake line had become dislodged and escaped from the riser cover of his container, and the steering toggle was spinning around above his back. He then deployed higher than normal—at 4,000 feet—in case he experienced a deployment problem. His toggle entangled with his main pilot chute, and the main container subsequently did not open. He attempted to retrieve the entanglement but was unsuccessful. He tilted the right side of his body down slightly before deploying his reserve to try and provide as much clear airspace as possible for the reserve pilot chute launch and canopy deployment. The reserve deployed uneventfully, and he landed safely under the canopy. Careful riser placement and stowing of excess steering line while packing the main canopy can help prevent this type of malfunction from occurring. In recent years, many container manufacturers have made riser cover modifications to help keep risers and steering lines secure until the main canopy is deployed. *Following an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, a student with five jumps flew a normal landing pattern and was on final approach to land with the assistance of an instructor on radio. The student partially flared the canopy by pulling both toggles to his shoulders at approximately 10 to 15 feet above the ground but did not pull the toggles any farther. The instructor used the radio to remind the student to flare fully, but the student never finished the maneuver and suffered a broken and dislocated ankle. Landing injuries can be avoided by flaring the canopy fully at the correct altitude and by keeping both legs together to perform a parachute landing fall in case of a rough landing. *A jumper with approximately 175 skydives and flying a 170-square-foot semi-elliptical canopy with a wing loading of 1.3:1 was participating in a canopy control course, which consisted of a series of training jumps throughout the day. The plan for this particular jump consisted of front riser maneuvers in the landing pattern—pulling both front risers down evenly to experiment with increasing the canopy's speed, then stopping all maneuvers above 300 feet to prepare for a normal-speed landing. Video review of this jumper's landing showed him holding both front risers down all the way through landing and actually pulling them down farther just before striking the ground. The jumper may have become confused and tried to flare the canopy at the last second using his front risers; however, pulling them down farther only increased his speed and rate of descent. The hard landing resulted in multiple broken bones, including his pelvis and three lower vertebrae. The jumper was airlifted to a local hospital, where he underwent a series of surgeries. He is expected to recover from his injuries after a long period of rehabilitation. This jumper had a history of aggressive canopy flight beyond his current skill level and failing to follow advice from more experienced jumpers. Canopy control courses have proven very effective for many jumpers, provided the course candidates actually follow the plan for each training jump. Jumpers who choose to ignore the training or skip steps run the risk of a serious injury such as in this case. Jumpers should receive detailed instructions for any new canopy landing maneuver, and the maneuver should be practiced repeatedly at a safe altitude before the jumper actually uses it for landing. Age: 49 Description: After an uneventful solo freefall, this jumper deployed his main canopy at approximately 2,500 feet. It is unclear whether he had a functioning parachute during any part of his canopy ride; however, witness reports indicated his canopy had spinning line twists for at least the last seven to 10 revolutions before he struck the ground in a fast, spiraling descent. He received immediate medical attention, but died at the scene from internal injuries suffered in the hard landing. Conclusions: Although all witnesses agreed this jumper experienced line twists at the beginning and end of his canopy flight, some said he removed the twists for part of the canopy descent, while others reported that the twists never cleared and that he remained in spinning line twists for the entire descent. Investigators found this jumper with both toggles in his hands and both of the canopy's brakes released. This likely indicates that the he cleared the line twists at some point during descent and then released his brakes to steer his canopy. The report indicated this jumper had made aggressive toggle turns in the past. On most makes and models of canopies, it's possible to induce line twists by rapidly pulling down one toggle. In this situation, it would be difficult to regain control of the canopy with the steering lines caught in the line twists, as the canopy would almost certainly remain in a turn until the jumper could clear the twists. This type of self-induced malfunction has led to several fatal landings in the past after jumpers induced spinning line twists at a low altitude and didn't have the time or altitude to safely handle the problem. If a jumper encounters a main canopy that cannot be landed safely, he must initiate emergency procedures at a safe altitude. Section 5-1 of the Skydiver's Information Manual recommends that students and A-licensed jumpers cut away and deploy their reserve at or above 2,500 feet above the ground and that B- through D-licensed holders take action at or above 1,800 feet. At some point, it becomes too low for a jumper to cut away, and deploying the reserve without first cutting away may be the only remaining option to try and slow the descent. Although the Skydiver's Information Manual doesn't recommend a specific altitude for licensed jumpers to transition to a reserve deployment without first cutting away, Section 4 of the SIM recommends that students who are 1,000 feet or below with a partial malfunction deploy their reserve without first cutting away their main. Experienced jumpers should also take into consideration their equipment and each possible malfunction scenario before deciding a hard deck for whether or not to first initiate a cutaway. A jumper should decide this altitude well before he gets on the plane so he can initiate a quick response when an emergency arises. Investigators did not report any problem with this jumper's equipment and concluded that the uncontrolled spin was most likely the result of spinning line twists induced by a rapid toggle turn at approximately 1,000 feet. Category G of the Integrated Student Program includes ground training and canopy drills, which include maximum-performance canopy turns. These drills help jumpers become familiar with the limits of each canopy they jump. The exercises should be performed above 2,500 feet in case line twists are induced; however, the intent of the drills is for each jumper to learn how his canopy reacts and how his harness begins to rotate just before line twists begin so he can stop the turn before twists are induced. System: Velocity Sports Infinity *A USPA PRO-rated jumper with 14,000 jumps was making a demonstration jump into a Level 2 landing site (an area that must allow 5,000 square feet per four jumpers) using a tandem parachute system in order to fly a large American flag into the event. Five other jumpers landed uneventfully and were in the landing area waiting to catch the 3,500-square-foot flag. While this skydiver was on final approach, a small child ran into the landing area and into his path and that of his large flag, which utilized a 75-pound weight at the bottom of the leading edge. The jumper was forced to turn hard in order to miss the child, which caused the weight of the flag to swing to one side and catch in a tree. The canopy then dropped the jumper hard from approximately 20 to 40 feet, where he was initially knocked unconscious. He received immediate medical attention at the scene and was airlifted to a local hospital. He suffered multiple broken bones, including vertebrae in his lower back, but is expected to fully recover from his injuries. Although the landing area had been secured by more than 40 adults and an experienced ground crew, the child had come from a cabin where he had been sleeping, and the ground crew apparently had not anticipated spectators to enter from that side of the field. Jumpers and ground crew should try and anticipate all possible scenarios regarding crowd control and prepare accordingly while erring on the side of caution. *After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, an accelerated freefall first-jump student initially followed a correct landing pattern and was on his final approach and facing into the wind for landing. At approximately 50 feet, the student made an unexpected 90-degree turn to a crosswind direction. He then partially flared his canopy, pulling the toggles to his chest. His instructor directed him via radio to return his toggles to full flight, which the student did for only a second or two before fully flaring his canopy at approximately 30 feet. He held his toggles down to full arm extension for the remainder of the canopy ride. The instructor told the student to assume the parachute landing fall position for landing, but the student kept his legs apart, and the hard landing resulted in a broken ankle. He is expected to make a full recovery. The student had followed his flight plan for landing up through his final approach, but he deviated from his training and disregarded directions given to him by his instructor both before the jump and via radio. A proper landing flare at the correct height above the ground—preferably facing into the wind—will improve a jumper's chance for a successful landing. *After an uneventful tandem freefall under a fully inflated drogue, a tandem instructor pulled the first drogue release handle at 5,500 feet. The drogue didn't release to initiate main canopy deployment, so the instructor pulled the secondary drogue release, which also had no effect. He then went back to ensure he had actually pulled the first drogue handle and then pulled the reserve ripcord. The reserve pilot chute and freebag cleared the inflated drogue, and the reserve inflated fully. The main canopy then also deployed and inflated behind the reserve canopy. The instructor pulled his cutaway handle to release the main canopy, but the reserve static line on the tandem system was connected to both risers, which caused the main canopy to slide up the reserve lines and choke off the reserve canopy to approximately one-third its normal size. The main canopy remained mostly inflated above the reserve but created an uncontrollable right-hand turn. The pair landed hard with the canopy still in a turn. The tandem instructor suffered a broken leg, and the student complained of back pain after the landing; however, the report did not indicate the extent of either jumper's injuries. The tandem instructor was very experienced with a different tandem system, having made more than 2,000 tandem jumps. He had recently cross-trained to the Jump Shack Racer tandem system, which was the equipment used for this jump. The tandem drogue bridle was apparently packed in such a way as to prevent the drogue from releasing when either drogue release handle was pulled, which is a dangerous situation with any tandem system. Standard and emergency operating procedures differ between tandem systems; it is critical that a tandem instructor follow the correct emergency procedures for each system he uses. The Racer tandem system (along with all other models of Racer harness and containers) uses a reserve static-line lanyard that is connected to both main canopy risers. If the reserve canopy deploys and the main canopy inflates afterward, the instructor must disconnect the reserve static line before he releases the main canopy. Otherwise, the main risers will slide up the reserve with the RSL in front of the reserve risers and lines, thus choking off the reserve canopy. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 recommends that jumpers with both the main and reserve canopies inflated at the same time should disconnect the reserve static line before releasing the main canopy. All tandem instructors must carefully review the emergency procedures for the equipment they use, especially those who are rated on more than one tandem system and when the procedures differ between the two. Additionally, tandem systems must be packed in accordance to the manufacturer's instructions in order to ensure the system works as designed. Age: 33 Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a 180-degree turn at an unknown altitude and struck the ground while still in a diving turn. The hard landing resulted in multiple broken bones and internal injuries. He received immediate medical attention, but was pronounced dead on the scene. Conclusions: This jumper was landing off the normal landing area into a field close to the drop zone; he had flown his canopy downwind of the intended landing area for unknown reasons. Investigators suspect that he then made a last-second turn in an attempt to avoid power lines near where he landed. This jumper was jumping a elliptical canopy at a 1.4:1 wing-loading, which the manufacturer recommends for jumpers of intermediate experience level. The manufacturer does not list the number of jumps or experience required to be considered an intermediate jumper; however, jumpers at this wing loading should be very competent canopy pilots, which requires staying very current. At 500 jumps total and only 50 jumps in the past 12 months, this jumper's experience may have been a factor in the accidental low turn. Highly wing-loaded elliptical canopies will lose a large amount of altitude during a turn, and a jumper must always keep that in mind when flying this type of parachute. The landing pattern needs to be carefully considered, and all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 includes recommendations for off-field landings, which specifically warn against making low turns while avoiding obstacles. When faced with an off-field landing, a jumper should carefully scan the selected alternate landing area for any hazards while still high enough to fly to a different location if needed. Once the jumper has selected an alternate site, he should determine a descent strategy based upon the wind speed and direction, as well as the specific challenges of the area. A braked approach and landing can provide for a slower, safer descent into an unfamiliar landing area. Jumpers should practice braked canopy flight and landings often to become familiar with flying a canopy at slower forward speeds and descent rates. All jumpers can benefit from canopy training beyond the basic instruction taught to student skydivers. Many professional canopy schools offer this type of training, and SIM Sections 6-10 and 6-11 include useful information and canopy drills designed to improve the skills and knowledge of each jumper who works through the training outline with an experienced canopy coach. System: Sunrise Manufacturing Wings Age: 45 Description: After an uneventful solo freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a low turn under canopy and struck the ground hard while still in a diving turn. First responders found him lying on his side, unconscious but still breathing. He received immediate first aid and was taken by ambulance to a local hospital. As a result of the hard landing, he suffered multiple broken bones, internal injuries and head trauma. Due to the extent of his injuries, he was airlifted to a second hospital, where he died several hours after he arrived. Conclusions: A witness under canopy above this jumper observed him turn approximately 180 degrees before he struck the ground. Investigators believe he initiated the turn at an extremely low altitude, although there were no witnesses in a position to accurately gauge the altitude. Since there was no wind when this jumper's load took off, all seven skydivers on the plane agreed to land facing west unless the wind picked up from a different direction. A few minutes after they were under canopy, the wind increased slightly to a few miles per hour from the southeast. This jumper initially faced into the new wind direction during his landing approach but turned toward the northwest right before he struck the ground. He may have planned his final approach to land facing into the wind but changed his mind at the last minute in an attempt to face the direction initially agreed upon. There were no obstacles in the immediate area that should have influenced his decision about the landing direction. The report described this jumper as a conservative canopy pilot who was not known to have attended any structured canopy training course or to have ever worked with a more experienced canopy pilot on canopy skills. The evidence seems to indicate this was a case of a turn initiated too low in an attempt to land in the agreed-upon direction; however, it is difficult to come to determine the reason for the jumper's final turn at such a low altitude. Light, shifting winds can lead to jumpers on the same load landing in different directions as each jumper chases the wind sock or streamer when it changes direction. Wind speeds of just a few miles per hour will not greatly affect the landing flare, and it is almost always safer for jumpers on the same load to fly the same canopy pattern than for them to use a variety of approaches while attempting to follow a shifting wind sock. Smaller flags and wind streamers easily change direction with the slightest breeze, which can lead to confusion for jumpers under canopy trying to determine a wind orientation for their final approach and landing. A large tetrahedron can help establish a landing direction for all wind conditions, as it is unaffected by light winds and will stay pointing in one direction unless the wind speed increases beyond three or four miles per hour from another bearing. Many structured canopy courses include discussions on a large variety of landing conditions, including traffic management in variable winds; course training exercises typically include at least one crosswind landing in a controlled environment as well. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 include information and practice exercises that can help jumpers learn more about canopy flight through any course led by an experienced canopy coach. Regardless of wind direction or speed, it is safer to land a parachute that is flying straight with the wing level than it is to initiate a low turn to attempt to land into the wind. Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. System: Strong Enterprises Quasar II *A tandem pair attempted to return to the main landing area after opening at a normal tandem deployment altitude far upwind of the drop zone. The tandem instructor's final descent would have placed the pair close to the end of one of the airport's two runways. Because an aircraft was on final approach to that runway, the instructor was forced to choose a new—and less ideal—landing site, and the tandem pair landed crosswind into the only clear area available. As they reached the ground, the student caught his foot on rough ground and broke his ankle. The instructor was not injured. Tandem instructors should check the spot during drogue-fall and deploy higher than planned if safely possible to make it back to the main landing area. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 contains information on off-field landings and recommends that jumpers not waste altitude trying to reach the main landing area if a viable alternative is available. Once a jumper has selected an alternate landing area, he must carefully scan for power lines and other obstacles while still high enough to adjust his landing pattern if necessary. *A tandem instructor experienced a longer-than-normal climbout with his student and subsequently opened far upwind of the drop zone. After selecting an alternate landing area, the instructor observed a large set of power lines in his flight path when the pair was approximately 50 to 100 feet above the ground. He turned 90 degrees to the right in an attempt to miss the lines and land in a clear area, but the pair struck a smaller set of power lines after completing the turn. The impact detached the power lines from the pole and swung the tandem pair behind the canopy, which then surged forward as the two struck pavement face down. The student suffered injuries to his face and back from the hard landing, but the tandem instructor was uninjured. The student is expected to make a full recovery. As soon as a jumper realizes he cannot reach the intended landing area, he must select an off-field landing site. He should then carefully scan the new area for hazards, such as power lines or rough terrain, and adjust his landing pattern accordingly to avoid them. The report did not mention problems with visibility; however, this jump occurred late in the afternoon, which may have made it difficult for the instructor to see any ground hazards due to the position of the sun. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 includes off-field landing recommendations and suggests looking for power line towers or poles—since they're easier to spot than power lines themselves—while still high enough to adjust the landing pattern. *A skydiver with approximately 1,800 jumps was under an elliptical canopy at a wing loading of 1.5:1. He initiated a 90-degree turn to the left at approximately 100 feet and realized almost immediately he had started the turn too low. He pulled on both rear risers in an attempt to plane the canopy out, but his descent rate was still very steep. He released the risers and attempted to flare the canopy using his toggles; however, his left toggle was either initially not in his hand or slipped from it, and he struck the ground hard without flaring the canopy. He suffered multiple broken bones, including his pelvis and left femur, but is expected to make a full recovery. Jumpers should keep their hands in their toggles from the time they release their brakes until after they've landed. This includes jumpers using front or rear risers to control the canopy before the landing flare; any riser input should be made with toggles firmly in hand. USPA receives several reports each year of injuries that occur when a jumper either drops a toggle or does not have his toggles in hand when the canopy needs to be flared for landing. Although this jumper had initiated his final turn too low, a witness reported that “stabbing out” by flaring hard with both toggles would most likely have prevented the hard landing and injuries. Still, jumpers should initiate all high-performance turns with enough altitude to allow for the canopy to return to straight and level flight following the canopy's natural recovery arc. This jumper had attended an advanced canopy course a few months earlier. USPA and most canopy courses stress that a jumper should practice all landing maneuvers high above the landing area before attempting them on an actual landing. Jumpers should also be prepared to abort a turn at any time during the landing.
Age: 49 Description: Following an uneventful 11-way group freefall that broke off at 5,000 feet, this jumper deployed his main canopy at approximately 2,000 feet. Once his canopy inflated, it began to turn in an unreported direction. Shortly after, this jumper collided with a second skydiver from his group who had experienced line twists upon deployment and was unable to steer his main canopy. The first jumper became wrapped in the second jumper's canopy and lines, partially collapsing both parachutes. The entangled jumpers and canopies began to spin, with the second jumper thrown toward the outside of the entanglement and orbiting around the first jumper, who was still caught in the canopies. After 10 to 15 revolutions, the second jumper cut away his main canopy, and his Skyhook RSL activated his reserve almost immediately at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. After a few seconds, the two jumpers' main canopies disentangled from the first jumper, who then released his main canopy at an altitude estimated at 200 feet. His RSL activated his reserve immediately; however, the cutaway took place too low to allow for the reserve canopy to fully inflate before he struck the ground. He received immediate medical attention from medical professionals on the scene and was airlifted to a hospital, but he died of his injuries en route. The second jumper received injuries to his head, neck and chest from the canopy collision. He was treated at the local hospital and released a few hours later. Conclusion: As with many fatalities, this was caused by a chain of events that combined for a fatal result. Breaking any of the links in the chain may have changed the outcome. If the two jumpers had been farther apart during deployment, it may have allowed for the canopies to remain clear of each other after opening even though both jumpers experienced canopy problems that prevented on-heading openings. It's possible that the two jumpers tracked away from the formation in similar directions or that other traffic issues prevented them from tracking the direction they needed to go (typically 180 degrees from the center of the formation) to maintain a safe distance between them. Using a flat tracking position can help jumpers achieve more distance from the formation and gain separation from other jumpers in the group. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-1 recommends a breakoff altitude of at least 2,000 feet above the highest planned deployment. This group broke 3,000 feet above the Basic Safety Requirements' minimum opening altitude for C- and D-licensed skydivers of 2,000 feet, which should have provided the necessary separation for 11 experienced skydivers. Both jumpers were using elliptical canopies; the first had a wing loading of 1.5:1 and the second a 1.6:1. Canopies with higher wing loadings can close large distances in a short time, requiring even more space between jumpers during deployment. Jumpers should break off even higher when they are using slower opening and faster flying canopies. Investigators found the first jumper's main canopy with one brake unstowed, which may account for its off-heading opening and turn toward the other jumper. The second jumper experienced line twists, which would not have allowed for any directional control until they were cleared. Careful packing of the main canopy can help reduce the chance of line twists or a spinning main canopy upon deployment. Canopy wraps and entanglements are very disorienting and often cause jumpers to lose altitude rapidly due to the rotation of the canopies. Additionally, since each collision and entanglement results in a unique outcome, it's difficult to prepare or practice for the necessary response. Still, jumpers must respond quickly and correctly to provide enough altitude for a successful cutaway and reserve activation. Jumpers in a rapid spin who are surrounded by canopy lines and fabric can easily become disoriented, making it difficult to clear the entanglement and find clear space for a reserve deployment. Therefore, both jumpers in a wrap must communicate, remain altitude aware and react quickly. System: Sun Path Javelin Age: 39 Description: Following an uneventful multi-aircraft freefall skydive and initial canopy descent, this jumper flew his parachute directly above and behind another skydiver's canopy at approximately 40 feet above the ground. This jumper's canopy collapsed, and he struck the ground hard under his partially inflated main, suffering multiple broken bones and internal injuries. He received immediate medical attention and was airlifted to a local hospital, where he died of his injuries several hours later. Conclusion: This jumper was taking part in a large formation skydive with approximately 60 other skydivers. Large formations often require each jumper to fly in heavy canopy traffic in an orderly pattern for landing. On his final approach, this jumper's canopy apparently hit the wake turbulence of the canopy in front of him and immediately collapsed. Jumpers need to be aware of turbulence hazards to parachutes, which can come from many different sources. Each canopy creates a wake vortex capable of collapsing any parachute behind it; the turbulent air is found directly behind and above the canopy as it flies through the air. Additionally, wind passing over obstacles such as trees and buildings is disrupted, causing turbulence that can be found on and near the ground directly downwind of the obstructions. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 4 explains the effects of turbulence on canopies in Category C of the Integrated Student Program and cautions jumpers to anticipate turbulence 10 to 20 times the height of an obstacle on the downwind side. If possible, this jumper should have avoided the wake turbulence of the canopy in front of him by flying to the side of the canopy, rather than directly behind it. System: Sun Path Javelin *A skydiver with 544 jumps was competing in a swoop competition using an elliptical 120-square-foot canopy at a wing loading of 1.5:1. At approximately 600 feet, he initiated a 270-degree turn to start his high-performance approach. Witnesses reported that his turn was slow and that he apparently didn't realize how close he was to the ground as his canopy started its recovery arc to straight and level flight. He initially grabbed his rear risers to plane the canopy out above the ground. He then partially flared the canopy to one-quarter brakes just before he struck the ground hard while still in a steep descent. He suffered several broken bones, including a finger, clavicle and femur, along with several compressed vertebrae. He is expected to make a full recovery. The jumper may have been focused on the entry gate into the swoop course or on trying to build additional speed for his landing with a slow, diving turn. Jumpers who choose to make high-performance landings must be prepared to abort their turn at any point to provide a wing-level landing. Training with an experienced canopy coach can help reduce the risks of an injury, but regardless of training received, each jumper is responsible for staying altitude aware throughout his approach. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. * A jumper with approximately 700 jumps, under a 99-square-foot elliptical canopy with a wing-loading of 1.4:1, initiated a 180-degree turn at an altitude reported to be “a little low” (The specific altitude was not reported.) Witnesses observed the jumper using her rear risers for landing and stated she did not flare the canopy with her toggles before she struck the ground, still in a rapid descent. The hard landing resulted in injuries to her upper body, neck and head. None of her injuries required surgery; however, she must wear a neck brace for several months. This was the jumper's first jump on this canopy; the report estimated her previous parachute to be somewhere in the 120-square-foot range. Jumpers should exercise caution when downsizing and should plan a conservative approach and landing while learning the flight characteristics of any new canopy. Skydivers must practice their landing maneuvers at higher altitudes until they can do them smoothly and proficiently before bringing them down to pattern altitudes for landing. This jumper had been working on performance landings with the advice of experienced canopy pilots, but the report did not indicate if she had received any advice or training for the smaller parachute. Jumpers must complete their turns with enough altitude for their parachutes to level off for the landing flare.
Age: 51
Age: 27 Description: These two jumpers were above their intended landing area, one flying a left-hand pattern and the other a right-hand pattern. The two collided at approximately 400 feet AGL as both prepared to turn onto their final approaches into the main landing area. Their canopies entangled and remained together, spinning violently until the two jumpers struck the ground. One jumper died immediately, and the other died from his injuries shortly after he was transported to the hospital. Conclusions: The jumper flying the right-hand pattern was a student with 14 jumps. The jumper using a left-hand pattern was a military jumper under a military parachute system. The canopy damage from the collision indicated the student was probably slightly higher than the military jumper because the student's body and canopy lines struck the front left corner of the military jumper's canopy and suspension lines. The military jumper's canopy had line burns on the leading edges of the top and bottom skins of the parachute, as well as along the top of the canopy. The burns were likely caused by contact with the suspension lines of the student's canopy passing across the nose and top skin of the canopy. The student's reserve container also had line burns, probably created from friction with the military jumper's main canopy lines when the student passed through them during the collision. The student was not wearing a radio for this jump. Both jumpers may have been focused on the landing area, unaware of their close proximity to each other. The gray color of the military jumper's canopy and the low angle of the sun may have contributed to visibility problems. The planned landing pattern for either jumper was not reported, nor whether the drop zone requested right- or left-hand patterns for approaches to the landing area. Jumpers need to ensure clear airspace before making turns and remain extra vigilant when lighting conditions make it difficult to see other canopies. The airspace directly above and surrounding the landing area is the most likely place for a canopy collision, as jumpers often reach pattern altitude at the same time as others on the same load. Establishing canopy flight guidelines and a flight plan for each jumper on the load can help ensure an orderly flow of canopy traffic. System: Flying High Sidewinder System: Paratech GmbH TW9340 Age: 50 Age: 44 Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, these two jumpers prepared to land among approximately 30 other jumpers who took part in the same group freefall from two airplanes. The first jumper was at approximately 200 feet when the second jumper, flying at approximately 500 feet AGL, initiated a 270-degree turn. As the second jumper came out of his turn on final approach, he struck the first jumper from behind at a high rate of speed. Based on eyewitness accounts, the collision occurred at approximately 100-150 feet AGL. Both parachutes collapsed immediately, and the pair struck the ground hard approximately 50 feet apart. Both jumpers received immediate first aid; however, one was killed instantly by the hard impact, and the other died at the scene soon after the accident. Conclusions: The first jumper had been on final approach for several hundred feet with at least one other canopy nearby. The second jumper may have initially thought he had enough clear area below him to execute a 270-degree turn before he encountered traffic in his path as his canopy started its recovery arc; other canopies in the area may have blocked his view of the canopy he hit from behind. Even though the two canopies involved in the collision were the same size and the two jumpers had similar wing loadings, the additional speed generated by the 270-degree turn caused the two to collide at a high rate of speed. Jumpers who choose to make high-performance landings must ensure that there is clear airspace around them—ahead, behind, above, below and to the sides—and that there is no chance of striking another canopy during any phase of the canopy flight. Standard landing patterns typically consist of flying downwind, base and final legs of an approach, with 90-degree turns between each segment. Turns of more than 90 degrees do not fit well into a standard approach pattern and increase the chance of experiencing a collision. As a result of this incident and several others involving canopy collisions, USPA released several bulletins asking jumpers and drop zones to separate performance landings from other canopy traffic flying standard patterns. Drop zones can accomplish this physically, with a separate landing area for swoopers, or by time, with a low pass or high deployment to separate performance landings from others using the same landing area. System: Mirage G4 System: Sun Path Javelin Age: 27 Description: After an uneventful 3-way freefly jump and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a hard turn to the left approximately 50 feet above the ground. He struck the ground while still horizontal and with his canopy in a steep, diving turn. He suffered internal head injuries and multiple broken bones, including his pelvis and both legs. First responders found him unconscious but breathing on his own, and a jumper who works as a medical professional administered first aid until the rescue squad arrived. As the ambulance crew prepared to transport him to the hospital, the injured jumper regained consciousness and complained of pain and shortness of breath; however, he died of his injuries several hours later at the hospital. Conclusions: This jumper was considered very current, jumping nearly every weekend. He had recently begun to experiment with high-performance landings, and several jumpers had warned him about the dangers of his aggressive canopy flight at low altitudes. On this particular jump, video footage captured by a bystander showed that this jumper initiated a rapid front-riser turn approximately 50 feet above the landing area and struck the ground halfway through an apparent attempt at a 180-degree turn. The report indicated this jumper had made approximately 200 jumps with this parachute. The information also indicated he had never received structured canopy training and that he seemed to casually disregard warnings from other jumpers about his erratic landings. His wing loading, estimated at 1.4:1, placed him between the advanced and expert categories according to the canopy manufacturer's recommendations. Although the manufacturer does not specifically define what places a jumper in either category, many industry experts agree that 300-400 total jumps does not provide the experience necessary for classification as advanced or expert. The toxicology report from the medical examiner indicated this jumper had used cocaine within hours before his death. He also tested positive for marijuana use, although it is unknown whether it was recent enough before the jump to have played a role in his actions. In spite of repeated warnings from other jumpers who had observed his previous landings, this jumper continued to attempt high-performance landings without the necessary knowledge or training. The combination of rapid downsizing, lack of training and judgment, and the use of drugs that affected his decision-making skills and depth perception each played a role in this fatality. Separately, these issues have led to skydiving incidents and deaths in the past; combined, they significantly increased his chance of a fatal outcome. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. System: Velocity Sports Infinity * Following an uneventful 3-way freefly jump and initial canopy descent, a skydiver with 720 jumps and a wing loading of 1.7:1 initiated a 360-degree turn at approximately 500 feet AGL. He struck the ground hard before the canopy could recover to straight and level flight. The jumper suffered multiple broken bones, including his back and pelvis. He underwent surgery immediately following the accident and is expected to fully recover from his injuries. The jumper had not received any formal canopy training, and his exit weight exceeded the manufacturer's recommended maximum exit weight for the canopy he was jumping. All jumpers can benefit from canopy training, especially those who choose to make high-performance approaches. Jumpers who choose to make high-performance landings must be prepared to abort the approach at any point in the final turn to regain level flight for a safe landing. * A skydiver with 4,700 jumps was jumping a new military tandem container system with a large, front-mounted equipment bag. He pulled the drogue release handle at approximately 5,500 feet, which deployed the main canopy. The right steering line caught on part of the container, causing the main canopy to spin. After several attempts to clear the snagged line, the jumper initiated emergency procedures at approximately 3,000 feet. The main canopy and risers released from the 3-ring assembly but stayed attached to the container due to the snagged steering line. The reserve pilot chute and freebag deployed into the malfunctioned main canopy, preventing the reserve from extracting from the freebag and inflating. The jumper reached behind his head and grabbed the snagged steering line of the main parachute and frantically reeled in the canopy. After approximately 10 seconds, he had collected most of the main in his hands, and the reserve pilot chute cleared the entanglement and deployed the reserve. The reserve partially entangled with the uncollected portion of the 370-square-foot main, causing a slow spin to the left. By the time he reached 1,000 feet, he had most of the main canopy clear of the reserve, which was then flying normally. He released the brakes on the reserve canopy and landed uneventfully, engulfed in the cutaway main canopy but right on his intended target. The jumper later stated he made two critical mistakes that led to the incident: First, he should have checked the container before he made the jump. He had been rushed for time and decided to proceed without carefully checking the equipment. Second, he said he should have used his hook knife to cut the snagged steering line before pulling his cutaway handle—he had easy access to a hook knife during the entire jump. Hook knives do have their limitations, and a jumper must constantly be aware of his decision altitude for cutting away when attempting to clear a malfunction. This was a test jump with a relatively new system, and the manufacturer subsequently modified the particular model of rig to help prevent any chance of this type of malfunction from occurring again. Test jumps don't always go as planned; however, thorough preparation and a plan of action before the jump can help reduce the risks of a malfunction and help ensure a correct response if something goes wrong. In this case, the malfunction could most likely have been prevented with a thorough gear check before the jump. Age: 40 Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper collided with another jumper when the pair was approximately 300 feet above the ground. The two canopies entangled briefly, and both parachutes malfunctioned as a result of the collision. This jumper's canopy remained in a streamer configuration all the way to the ground. He received immediate medical attention but died on impact due to the hard landing. Conclusions: Both jumpers initiated a speed-inducing turn to some degree just prior to the collision. The second jumper, who was below the jumper who died, initiated a 270-degree left-hand turn and had begun to level off for his final approach when he was struck from behind. The initial approach of the jumper who died was not witnessed, however he generated enough speed to overtake the other jumper. The impact created a brief canopy wrap that quickly cleared. The second jumper wore two prosthetic legs, which were torn loose as a result of the collision. Even though his main canopy began to spin, it remained mostly inflated and provided a survivable descent rate. He suffered several broken bones from the hard landing but is expected to make a full recovery. Both jumpers deployed their reserve canopies just before striking the ground; however, there was not enough altitude for either reserve to inflate. A high-performance landing will cover hundreds of feet of vertical and horizontal distance in just a few seconds. The intended flight path of a canopy pilot-including the air in front of, beside, below and behind the jumper-needs to provide a wide, unobstructed path to his final touchdown. If a jumper faces any risk of encountering other canopy traffic, he must abort the maneuver in the interest of safety. In this case, both canopy pilots performed high-performance approaches, apparently unaware of each other's location. Although the jump took place at a large skydiving boogie, the report indicated canopy traffic was light at the time of the collision. Regardless of the number of parachutes in the air, each skydiver needs to fly a predictable canopy descent that provides separation from other traffic. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 contain valuable information regarding high-performance canopy flight, including traffic management and the importance of awareness of other canopies during descent and while in the landing pattern. System: Sun Path Javelin Age: 31 Description: In preparation for landing, this jumper initiated a 450-degree front-riser turn at an unknown altitude. Witnesses reported seeing him very close to another canopy approximately 250 feet above the landing area. He then initiated a 180-degree toggle turn in an apparent attempt to avoid the other canopy and struck the ground while still in a steep, diving turn. He received immediate medical attention but was pronounced dead at the scene. Conclusions: The intended landing approach of this jumper is unclear. Review of the videotape from the camera he wore shows he had completed a 360-degree left turn before the other canopy came into view in the lower corner of his camera. He apparently did not see the other canopy and continued the turn for another 90 degrees before he noticed the other skydiver. This jumper then initiated the toggle turn to his right, apparently to avoid the imminent collision. At this point, he was below the second canopy but continued with his turn and struck the ground at a high rate of speed. A better course of action in this case may have been for this jumper to stop turning once below the other canopy and land in a clear area. The report did not indicate whether there were other obstacles or canopies that may have been a factor. This jump took place during a busy skydiving boogie, although witnesses reported canopy traffic was not heavy at the time of the accident. During the boogie, the drop zone had encouraged jumpers to fly left- and right-hand patterns that would keep them from crossing the center of the landing area to help control the flow of canopy traffic and reduce the risk of collisions. Any jumper flying a pattern other than the established flow of traffic faces a greater risk of a collision. High-performance approaches often use steep, diving turns that can quickly lead to conflicts with any other canopy pilots in the immediate area. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 contain valuable information regarding high-performance canopy flight, including traffic management and the importance of awareness of other parachutes during canopy descent and while in the landing pattern. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare. System: Sun Path Javelin |